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PREFACE

Throughout this dissertation, translations of

Aristotle are, unless indicated otherwise, my own.
must acknowledge

,

however, that in translating,

always taken account of the translations of E.

1

I

have

S.

Forster and W. A. Pickara-Cambridge
I

have also benefited from the study of trans-

lations of selected passages by S. L. Peterson.

V

Aristotle on Paradoxes of Accidence
(September, 1974)

Anthony Willing, 3. A., Northwestern College,
M.A., University of Minnesota

Directed by:

Dr. Gareth B. Matthews

In his treatment of the fallacy of "accidence"
("trcxpcx

xoj"

-c6

)

in De Sophisticis Elenchis

,

Aris-

totle discusses a well-known epistemic paradox which
"the Ccriscus Puzzle."

In Chapter I,

I

I

call

present and examine

two recent interpretations of Aristotle's solution to that

paradox.

I

call one of these "the indiscernibility inter-

pretation"; the other

tation."

I

I

call "the substitutivity interpre-

argue that there are serious objections to each.

The task, then. Is to present a more adequate account.

According to Aristotle, the Coriscus Puzzle is to
be dealt with in the same way as the other sophisms listed

under the heading,

'paradoxes of accidence'.

It is clear,

then, that an adequate interpretation of Aristotle's

solution to the Coriscus Puzzle must be such that it can,
with some degree of plausibility, be extended to those
other examples

.

With this in mind, preparatory to examining

Aristotle's remarks on solving paradoxes of accidence,

I

attempt in Chapter II a first reconstruction of each of
these sophisms for which he

— Aristotle — thinks

one and one

vi

same solution suffices.
In Chapter III,

I

try to formulate and explicate

the fallacious principle that Aristotle seems to think is

operative in the various paradoxes of accidence.
this principle "the principle of accidence."

I

call

My discussion

of the principle of accidence involves, among other things,
an attempt to clarify Aristotle’s use of

’

o-vj^eys^KcU’

(’accident') in this context.

Keeping in mind the groundwork laid in the previous chapter,

I

return, in Chapter IV, to the Coriscus

There

I

present, in some detail, my own account

Puzzle.

of Aristotle's solution to that paradox.

This involves,

of course, among other things, showing how Aristotle might

have come to think of the Coriscus Puzzle as arising from
an appeal to the fallacious principle of accidence.

How-

ever, a number of other interesting features of the solu-

tion are also explored.

Finally, in Chapter V,

I

take up the remaining

paradoxes of accidence (laid out in Chapter II) to show
how, given my interpretation of Aristotle's solution to

the Coriscus Puzzle, the basic strategy of that solution

might understandably have been thought to be applicable to
those cases as well.

vii
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CHAPTER
THE-

CORISCUS PUZZLE:

I

A PERENNIAL PARADOX

Introduction to the Puzzle
In De Sop h isticis Elenchis XXIV Aristotle addresses

himself to a puzzle which is still a topic of controversy
The puzzle is this.

.

It is conceivable that the following

sentences might all be true at once:
You know Coriscus
You do not knew the one approaching
Coriscus is the one approaching.

(1)
(2)
(3)

But, supposing that (1)

(2) and

(3)

are true, one might go

on to draw the following conclusion:
You know and you do not know the same thing.

(4)

The inference from (1) (2) and (3) to (4) may seem some-

what plausible.
(1)

However,

(4)

is a contradiction.

and (3) are assumed true, but (4) is false

(2)

necessarily false

— the

inference from (1)

must, despite appearances, be invalid.

I

(2)

Sc,

since

— in

fact,

and (3) to (4)

shall call this

paradox "the Coriscus Puzzle."
Nowhere does Aristotle lay out the above sophism
in full.

In fact, in his first mention of the argument he

refers to it simply as the "Do you know the one approaching?"

However, at .179b3~4 we are given a fairly clear

indication that the "Do you know the one approaching?
lPr om hereon,
be abbreviated as

'

'

De Sophlsticis Elenchis
SE
'

1

will sometimes

2

does run as proposed in the previous paragraph.
not the case

,

"

says Aristotle, "that if

I

but do not know the one approaching, then

not know the same thing."

"it is

know Coriscus
I

know and do

The inference under discussion

here seems plainly to be that from (1) (2) and (presumably,

although it is not explicitly stated here) (3) to (4).
The Coriscus Puzzle has a long history.

The fact

that Aristotle takes no great pains to spell out the

paradox in detail suggests, perhaps

established example of the time.

,

that it was a well-

This is confirmed to

some extent by Diogenes Laertius who ascribes the argu-

ment "The Veiled Figure"

— presumably

a version of the Coris-

cus argument--to Eubulides the Megarian, a contemporary of

Aristotle’s.

Since then, one finds arguments signifi-

cantly like the Coriscus argument discussed by the Stoic,
Lucian,

3

and,

in mediaeval times, by William of Sherwood,

**

^Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosoohers
II,

108.

^The "Veiled Figure" is, as is noted by C L.
Hamblin in Fallacies
(London:
Methuen and Co., 1970),
p. 90, stated in Lucian’s Philosophies For Sale
do you know your own father?
Chrysippus
Yes
Buyer:
But if I put a veiled figure before you
Chyrsippus
and asked you if you knew him, what will
you say?
That I don’t, of course.
Buyer:
But the veiled figure turns out to be
Chrysippus
your own father; so if you don’t know
him, you evidently don’t know your own
father.
.

:

.

.

.

^William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic tr. with
introduction and notes by Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1966), pp. 152-153*
,

3

Pseudo-Scotus

,5

and Buridan,6 among others.

Finally, the

Coriscus Puzzle has found its way into contemporary
literature on epistemic logic
"The Logic of Knowing"

Knowledge and Belief )

(a

— e.g.

Roderick M. Chisholm's

review of Jaakko Hintikka's

.

But my concern with the Coriscus Puzzle is not to

trace its history; nor is it primarily to compare and

evaluate various solutions to the puzzle.

Rather,

to try to get clear on Aristotle's own solution.

I

want

That, in

itself, as will be seen, is a considerable undertaking.
A number of attempts have been made to spell out

Some of

Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle.

these interpretations, however, are clearly unsatisfactory
and have,

I

believe, been adequately dealt with by others.

0

But recently two more interesting interpretations have been

offered.

Their special interest lies in the fact that they

raise important issues that have considerable currence in
5john Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Elenchorum
XL/iesp. Quns
Vives 1891
(Paris!
Vol 2, Opera Omnia
XLVIII
,

.

,

,

.

)

,

Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth tr.
with introduction by Theodore Kermit Scott (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crof t s 1966), pp 124 126 133-134
6 John

,

.

,

,

,

.

Chisholm, "The Logic of Knowing,
790ff.
The Journal of Philosophy, LX, No. 25 (1963)?
7 Roderick M.

Masker
8ln particular, see S. L. Peterson, The
Princeton,
dissertation,
Paradox, (unpublished Ph.D.
But see also C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies
1969), pp 18-28.
207 - 208
pp. 84 - 87
.

.

,

5

4

contemporary philosophical literature.
of this chapter, then,

interpretations.

I

In the remainder

want to discuss each of these

My opinion is that while each is pro-

vocative and perhaps may seem, initially, to be somewhat
plausible, neither is ultimately satisfactory as an account
of Aristotle’s own solution.

The Indiscernibility Interpretation
In a recent paper entitled "Aristotle on Sameness

and Oneness," Nicholas P. White presents a number of

interesting theses concerning Aristotle's dealings with
identity.

9

Of special interest here, however, is the claim

that between Topics and De Sophistic is Elenchis there is

a

shift in Aristotle's position on identity. 10

White maintains--correctly

,

I

think

— that

at Topics

152b25-29 Aristotle endorses a principle which he--White
calls "Leibniz' Law" or "LL."

According to White, this

principle can be "loosely expressed" as
(PI)

If A and B are identical, then whatever is
true of the one is true of the other. 11

But how, more precisely, is (PI) to be understood?
It seems reasonable to assume that the consequent

of (Pl)

viz.

'Whatever is true of the one is true of the

9Hicholas P. White, "Aristotle on Sameness and One177-197,
ness," The Philosophical Review LXXX, No. 2 (1971),
,

10 Ibid.

,

esp. pp.

11 Ibid

,

pp.

178-182.

178-179.

5

— may

other'

be restated as

if and only if B has F

and ’B

1

'for any attribute, F, A has F

But, in that case, since

5

.

’A’

in (PI) are presumably variables, we might

reformulate (PI) as
(P2)

(x) (y ) (if x
if y has F )

=

y then

(F)(x has F if and only

)

And (P2) is what is commonly referred to as "the principle
of the indiscernibility of identicals."

says that Aristotle, in Topics

Thus, when White

endorses LL,

,

I

take him to

be saying, alternatively, that Aristotle there endorses

the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals
(P2)

— i.e.

12

However--to continue with White's point

Aristotle endorsed LL in Topics
principle led to paradoxes.
such paradox.

,

— although

he soon found that this

The Coriscus Puzzle, is one

So, according to White, in De Sophisticis

Elenchis we find Aristotle trying to resolve the Coriscus
Puzzle by abandoning the unrestricted form of LL.

White

puts the point concisely:
12t personally, prefer to call (P2) "the principle
of identicals" rather than Leibniz
indiscernibility
of the
in
In the first place, as observed by Fred Feldman
Law."
Philosophical
The
"Leibniz and 'Leibniz' Law',"
used
LXXIX No. 4 (1970), p. 510, the name 'Leibniz' Law' is
principle
the
by many philosophers to refer to
(x)(y)(x = y if and only if (F)(Fx if and only if Fy )
it seems
instead of simply (P2). And, in addition to this,
since
Law,
not really appropriate to call (P2) "Leibniz'
little
there is
again, as Feldman has convincingly argued—
that pr^n
either
endorsed
to suggest that Leibniz himself
above.
stated
ciple or, a fortiori the biconditional
,

)

,

,

6

As Aristotle sees it, the problem is that one and the
same thing would seem both to have and to lack the
attribute of being known by me. For this reason, he
gives in and puts a new sort of restriction on LL.
He retreats from saying without qualification that if
A and B are the same, then whatever is true of the
one is true of the other.
Rather, he maintains (to
use his manner of putting it) that the same things
belong only to things which are without difference
and one in substance. 13

The strategy here seem clear.

First, on this inter-

pretation of Aristotle's treatment of the Coriscus Puzzle,
Aristotle is assumed to have thought that the inference
from

(4)

You know Coriscus
You do not know the one approaching
Coriscus is the one approaching

(1)
(2)
(3)

You know and you do not know the same thing

depends, at least in part, on LL.

And indeed this would be

For if we take ’You do not know' in (2)

quite reasonable.

to express an attribute of Coriscus, and (3) to be assert-

ing that Coriscus and the one approaching are identical,

then the argument might be laid out more explicitly in the

following way:
a
as 'the one approaching’
Coriscus
’Kx' as 'x has the attribute of being known by you’,
and ~Kx as x has the attribute of being not known
by you' )
( Premiss
Kc
(1)
( Premiss
~Ka
(2)
=
( Premiss
a
c
(3)
( P2 )
and LL - i
~Kc
((2), (3)
(4)
Conjunction)
~Kc
(*D
Kc
((1),
(5)
Kx)
(3x ) (Kx *
((5), Existential Generalization)
(6)

(Read

'

c

'

'

'

as

'
'

'

’

'

.

•

^white, op.cit..

p.

179.

7

LL comes in, then, in the move from (2) and (3) to (4). 14
Second, however. White's interpretation has Aris-

totle solving the paradox by simply giving up the unre-

stricted version of LL

version

— i.e.

(P2)

— in

favor of a restricted

— viz

(P3)
(x)(y)(if x - y and x and y are one substance
then (F ) (x has F if and only if y has F)).

Now, the reasoning goes, although (4) follows from (2) and
(3) by

(

P2

)

it does not follow by

using (P3) we need, in addition to
'c

and a are one in substance'.

(P3).

To derive (4)

and (3), the premiss

(2)

But if (4) no longer

follows then neither do (5) and (6).

And, in that case,

the paradox disappears.
*

*

White's interpretation

*

— or

as I label it in the

heading of this section, "the indiscernibility interpretation"

— seems,

at first glance, very neat.

Yet

I

am not

convinced that this account of the De Sophisticis Elenchis
passage does justice to Aristotle.

In fact, there are

several considerations that seem to me to suggest that we

^Actually, given White's formulation of LL, the
justification for the inference from (2) and (3) to (4) requires appeal to additional logical rules e.g. a universal
instantiation rule (applied twice), and modus ponens (applied
But the move could, of course, be made directly, if
twice).
'LL' were taken to refer to the rule of inference,

—

is true, then it is
is true, then, if
_1
r
permissible to infer that 0/3 is true, and, if
is true.
is true, then it is permissible to infer that

If

ro< =/3 1

8

would do well to look for an alternative to White’s suggestion.

Let me present what

I

take to be some of the

more important of these.
First, let us examine more closely the so-called

"shift" in Aristotle’s position on identity that White

claims to find between Topics and De Sophistlcis Elenchis

.

On White's interpretation, it seems that Aristotle is

supposed to have given up the principle
(x)(y)(if
y has F))

(P2)

x = y

then (F)(x has F if and only if

in favor of the principle

(x)(y)(if x = y and x and y are one in substance
then (F)(x has F if and only if y has F)).

(P3)

(

P3

is alleged to be a restricted version of (P2).

But one wonders just what that restriction amounts to.

More specifically, how does what is expressed by
x and y are one in substance'

by 'x = y’?

'x = y and

differ from what is expressed

Is it not the case that if x and y are identi-

cal, then it follows that x and y are "one in substance"?
Or, to put it another way, are we to suppose that x and y

might be identical although they are different in substance?

White gives us no help on this.
The second objection to White's interpretation of

of Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle also concerns
the so-called "restricted version of LL."

White claims to

find this principle in the following quotation from De

Sophist icis Elenchis 179a38-bl:

"^ovo^ ykp

to?^

9
f

3

OUCT(«V

TTj\J

0

Ne/*?

/

o(Otc< ^0|00tj

OV

K<*(.

(call this quotation "Q").

OUCT( V #1T0<VTU SoKzl Tfliut A urr«p^£.{v"

But, on closer examination,

one wonders what could have led White to regard this

statement

Q

— as

a

formulation of something like the re-

stricted LL.
It seems that a plausible translation of Q should

go something like this:

"For only to things that are in-

distinguishable and one in substance is it generally
agreed that all the same attributes belong. "15

That is,

Aristotle's principle here appears to be
(P4)

Only things that are indistinguishable and one
substance have all their attributes in common.

But (P4) hardly says the same as (P3).

Rather, it seems

to be more accurately rendered by
(P5)

(x)(y)(if (F)(x has F is and only if -y has F),
then x = y and x and y are one in substance).

And (P5) is the converse of (P3).
In view of this, one might suppose that, since

White purports to find something like (P3) in

he simply

Q,

has in mind a different translation of Q from the one sug-

gested.

More specifically, one would expect that he re-

jects the suggestion that the principle expressed in Q is
(

pi*

)

.

Perhaps

— one

might conjecture

— White

thinks that Q

should be translated In something like the following way:
"The only things that are indistinguishable and one in
The
translation is Pickard-Cambridge s
essentials.
in
agree
Poste
translations of Forster and
15l’he

'

.

10

substance (are things that) have all their attributes
in
common.” Then (P3), as opposed to (P5), would be the
more

accurate rendering.
But, in fact. White himself rules out this possi-

bility.
•

•

•

For his own paraphrase of Q runs as follows:
the sarae things belong only to things which are

without difference and one in substance.”^

And this

reading supports the view that in this passage Aristotle
intends something more like (P5) than (P3).
In summary, then, the objection to be made here is

that it is simply not clear why White wants to insist that
in asserting Q Aristotle was advocating a restricted version

of Leibniz' Law

— i.e.

(P2).

In fact. White seems to have

misunderstood the logical form of his own paraphrase of the
passage in question.
Finally, in addition to the foregoing difficulties,
there is an even more convincing reason for doubting the

correctness of White's interpretation of Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle.
In De Sophisticis Elenchls

,

Aristotle's main pro-

ject is, of course, to classify fallacies.

The argument

that gives rise to the Coriscus Puzzle is an example of what

Aristotle calls the fallacy

l^White, op cit
,

.

p.

nape* to

179.

crujj.pe/S'yjKo^

— or,

as

11
I

shall call it,

chapters

I

’’the

fallacy of accidence "17
.

In later

shall discuss the nature of this fallacy in

some detail.

But for now it is sufficient to point out

that, on Aristotle's view, at least part of what has gone

wrong in the Coriscus argument is that the proponent of
the argument has made use of a fallacious principle.

But

what is this principle?
In De Sophistlcis Elenchis l?9a26ff. Aristotle

says

With respect to arguments from accidence, one and the
same solution [suffices] for all.
For, since it is
undetermined whether that which is said belongs to the
subject whenever it belongs to the accident, and since
in some cases it is thought to and said to, but in
others this is said to be not necessary, we ought,
therefore, in all cases alike, when a conclusion has
been reached, say that it is not necessary. But it is
necessary to have an examp le to bring forward. All
such arguments as those following are from accidence.
'Do you know what I am about to ask you?'
'Do you
know the one approaching or the masked one?’
'Is the
statue your work?' or 'Is the dog your father?' 'Are
the few taken a few times a few?'
It is clear in all
these cases [i.e. in the counter-examples just mentioned] that it is not necessary that the attribute
be true of the accident and the subject.
The suggestion here seems to be that the fallacious prin-

ciple that is operative in arguments such as the one that
gives rise to the Coriscus Puzzle (i.e. the "Do you know
the one approaching?" paradox) is a principle to the effect

course, 'accidence', as used here, is a word
My use of the word has nothing to do
of my own invention.
with the grammarian's use on which it refers to that part
Rather, as I use
of grammar concerned with inflections.
accident of."
an
"being
relation,
it, it designates the
is a fallacy
seen,
be
will
as
The "fallacy of accidence,"
way.
this
Involving entities which are related in

^Of

12

that a given thing has all the attributes that
its acci-

dents have.
(P6)

We might express the principle as follows:

If x is an accident of y, then if x has P then
y has F.

White tells us that Aristotle’s view is that in

order to solve the Coriscus Puzzle, we should give up
Leibniz’ Law

— i.e.

(P2).

But, according to the above

passage, Aristotle’s position is that the key to the so-

lution of such paradoxes lies in the rejection of the principle (P6).

And although the meaning of (P6) stands in

need of explication, it is my
point later

— that

view— and

I

shall argue the

it is certainly not equivalent to, nor is

it even implied by,

(P2).-^

Consequently,

I

think it is

safe to say that the rejection of (P6) is not incompatible

with the continued acceptance of (?2).

In other words, if

Aristotle thinks that in order to solve such paradoxes as
the Coriscus Puzzle, we must give up (P6), he is not thereby committed to the rejection of Leibniz' Law.
In conclusion, then, not only has White offered

little or no reason to suppose that Aristotle's solution to
the Coriscus Puzzle consists in the rejection of Leibniz’
Law; but, in addition, the text itself seems to indicate

that Aristotle has in mind a rather different solution.
18 See Ch.

III.

13

The Substitut ivlty Interpretation
One of the most concentrated efforts

— at

least in

recent years— to provide an account of Aristotle’s treat-

ment of the Coriscus Puzzle is to be found in

S.

Peterson’s dissertation. The Masker Paradox 19
.

L.
I

find

myself in agreement with a number of points that Peterson
makes; but there are basic issues on which we clearly disagree.

In this section I propose, first, to sketch the key

elements of Peterson’s view, which, for reasons that will
become clear,
tation."
I

I

shall label "the substitutivity interpre-

Then, as with the indiscernibility interpretation,

shall go on to present several reasons why

I

find the

substitutivity interpretation unsatisfactory.

Reconstruction of the Coriscus Puzzle
the argument
(1)
(2)
(3)
,*.(4)

— call

it

.

Although

"Al”

You know Coriscus
You do not know the one approaching
Coriscus is the one approaching
You know and you do not know the same thing

seems to have the virtue of incorporating a quite literal

translation of the textual clues for the Coriscus Puzzle,
Peterson is not satisfied with it as a representation of the
argument that Aristotle has In mind.

Her reason is that Al

"invites one to suppose that the 'know’ is the 'know’ of

acquaintance, because the reconstruction gives ’know’ a
19 S

and III.

.

L.

Peterson, The Masker Paradox

,

esp.

chs

.

I

m
singular object which is a name of a person."

"The invi-

tation is unfortunate," Peterson continues,
for if it is taken up, the argument turns out to have
the rather obviously false premiss.
The supposed
paradox has a simple resolution, then, and one that
Aristotle would doubtless have mentioned if he had
noticed it. Aristotle counts arguments with false
premisses as criticizable in that respect, as being,
let’s say, unconvincing. Moreover, the inference
of argument [Al] seems perfectly unobjectionable.
There are no evident counter-examples to a principle
that urges one to deal with the ’know' of acquaintance
as it is dealt with here
But Aristotle seems concerned to say that it does not follow from the premisses he has in mind that you know and do not know
the same thing. 20
.

What is needed in an adequate reconstruction of

Aristotle's argument, according to Peterson, is "some verb
to translate what is usually rendered ’know’ in the argu-

ment which will allow that
You
You

.

.

.

.

...

.

Coriscus

.

the one approaching

may differ in truth value, even though Coriscus is the one

approaching 21

But Peterson thinks there is no such verb

.

in English.

So she suggests that each of the expressions

’know Coriscus’ and 'know the one approaching' might be

eliminated in favor of ’know who Coriscus is' and 'know who
the one approaching is', respectively.

These latter expressions, however, are taken by

Peterson to be "rather viciously indeterminate as to the

necessary and sufficient conditions for their being true
20 Ibid

.

,

p

21 Ibid

.

,

p.

.

21
28.
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of someone. "22

Yet she claims that such conditions can be

fixed by the addition of a qualification as in 'You know

who Coriscus is with r espect to his being the darkest one
in the market', or 'you know who Churchill is with respect
to hi s role in the war cabinet

'.

far, Peterson suggests one further

And, having gone this

— what

seems to her

quite natural step:

When 'know who Coriscus is' or 'know who Churchill is'
are fixed in sense and truth conditions in the way
indicated, by the addition of some appropriate qualification such as 'with respect to his role in the war
Cabinet', it looks clear that the necessary and sufficient conditions for your knowing who Churchill,
for example, is with respect to his role in the war
Cabinet is your knowing that Churchill is the war
And, we can imagine a situation in
Prime Minister.
which knowing who Coriscus is for the purpose of some
conversation is knowing that Coriscus is the darkestThe locution 'knows that
one in the market-place.
Coriscus is such and such' is simpler and more natural
than 'knows who Coriscus is with respect to such and
such', and it is as clear what are the conditions of
its being true of you as it is clear what are the
conditions of the former's being true of you.o
So, finally,

the outcome of Peterson’s line of think-

ing is the following reconstruction of the Coriscus Puzzle:
A2:

(1)

You know that Coriscus is the darkest one in
tl"i0 market
You do not know that the one approaching is
the darkest one in the market
Coriscus is the one approaching.
You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest
one in the market
•

(2)
(3)
;> (

4

)

Peterson, then, seems to be sympa
22jbid.
p. 30.
treatment
thetic to what Chisholm has called a "pragmatic
Logic of
The
Chisholm,
(See Roderick M.
of 'knows who'.
Knowing, " p 790 )
1

.

23ibid.

,

pp«

31-32.
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You do and do not know that Coriscus is the
darkest one in the market. 24

(5)

The Sophist’s Principle

.

The problematic move in

A2, according to Peterson's reading of Aristotle, is from

lines (2) and (3) to line (4).

How might a proponent of

the argument-let us call him "the sophist"

that step?

— try

to justify

According to Peterson, "The rule which the

sophist uses to justify his argument seems to have been the
rule [call it "SP"]:
If x is y (or, if y is an accident of x) then infer
that anything true of x is true of y."2$

Evidence for this, says Peterson, is to be found in the
fact that this is the rule that Aristotle is out to reject
(see SE l66b26-32;

179a30-31; 179a36).

But how, more precisely, would Peterson have us

understand the sophist's principle, SP?
in the following remark.

Peterson,

We get some help

"It is at least; clear," says

"that it is being supposed [by Aristotle] that

Leibniz’ Law is the principle that the sophist would offer
My advisor, Gareth B. Matthews, has
2^ibid., p. 32.
to
the
fact that, whatever else might be
attention
drav/n my
said for or against this version of the Coriscus Puzzle, it
does not have the conclusion that Aristotle conceives of the
paradox as having. As Peterson, herself, points out earlier
Aristotle seems conMasker Paradox p. 21),
( The
cerned to say that it does not follow from the premisses he
has in mind that you know and do not know the same thing."
Of course, Peterson might reply that the "thing” in question
is the proposition, that Coriscus is the darkest one in the
But it seems unlikely that this is the sort ol
market.
"thing" that Aristotle had in mind.

"...

,

2 5ibid.,

p.

116

.

17

in justification of his argument "26

Thus the principle

.

.

SP seems to be regarded as none other than Leibniz' Law.
But what is Peterson here calling "Leibniz' Law"?
At the beginning of her second chapter, Peterson

claims to give us a number of different formulations of
the principle which she proposes to call "Leibniz' Law."

Carnap puts the principle this way:
The principle of interchangeability (or subst itutivity
The principle occurs in either of two forms:
a.
If two expressions name the same entity, then
a true sentence remains true when the one is
replaced in it by the other.
In our terminology
the two expressions are interchangeable (everywhere).
=
" (or
b.
If an identity sentence "
" or "
is identical with
") is true, then the two
is the same as
" and "
" are
argument expressions "
interchangeable (everywhere).
Russell puts It another, rather confusing, way:
If a is identical with b, whatever is true of
the one is true of the other, and either may be
substituted for the other in any proposition
without altering the truth or falsehood of that
proposition
It occurs as a rule of inference in Kalish and Montague:
we may infer (pLrjl where \
From r $ = yp and 0C*;']
and rj are names and the formula pZrjJ is obtained
from the formula cf> L£,H by replacing an occurrence
of C, by r).
Another is given by Church, following Frege:
When a constituent name is replaced by another having the same denotation, the denotation of the
entire name is not changed. 27
.

)

.

.

.

"...

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Of these four formulations, the three most precise (i.e.
Carnap's, Kalish and Montague’s, and Church's

— Peterson

herself finds Russell's principle unclear) plainly have to
26 Ibid
2

.

,

p.

.

,

pp.

114.

"

lbid

46-47.
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do with substitution of co-designative
expressions in

larger expressions.

It

the name ’Leibniz’ Law’

tutivity.

seems, then, that Peterson is using
to refer to a principle of substi-

And since the sophist’s principle

— SP — is,

ac-

cording to Peterson, none other than Leibniz’ Law, it
appears that SP, itself, is here to be treated as a meta-

linguistic principle.
Of course, the main advantage of a metalinguistic

reading of SP is that it does provide a justification for
the move from lines (2) and (3) to (4) in Peterson’s

reconstruction of Aristotle's argument, given that
’Coriscus’ and 'the one approaching' are co-designative
terms.

Let us, for convenience, adopt Carnap's first for-

mulation of "the principle of interchangeability" as the
reading that Peterson proposes for SP.

Then, from that

principle, we can conclude that since (as Peterson thinks

Aristotle allows)

'Coriscus' and 'the one approaching’ name

the same entity, and 'You do not know that the one approach-

ing is the darkest one in the market’ is true, that 'You
do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one in the market’
is true.

What we have so far, then, is a reconstruction of
the Coriscus argument which has the virtue of being such

that all its premisses may be true together, although its

conclusion is a contradiction.

Moreover, Peterson has

given us, in terms of a familiar and not altogether im-

19

plausible principle (at least, perhaps at first glance),
a

reading of the rule that she takes Aristotle's sophist
to
be employing in the argument.

We are in a position, now,

to turn to Peterson's account of Aristotle's solution
to

the paradox.
The Solution

.

It

is clear that Aristotle's response

to the proponent of the Coriscus Puzzle consists, at least

in part, in the objection that the argument that gives rise
to the puzzle is invalid.

179b2-4 ("So it is

not:

Thus Peterson, after citing SE

the case that if

do not know the one approaching that

I

I

know Coriscus but

know and do not know

the same one"), goes on to say, "It is clear from this last

remark that part of Aristotle's solution to the paradox is
to say that the inference does not follow. "28

To be more specific, Peterson claims that the precise

point at which the argument goes awry is in the move from
lines (2) and (3) to (4)

We have been told that

(of A2).

the principle that the sophist offers in defence of that

move is SP.

So,

on Peterson's view, Aristotle fixes on the

appeal to SP as the flaw in the sophist's puzzle.

Petersen's words, "Aristotle

.

.

.

In

would say that Leibniz'

Law [i.e. SP] has been applied, but that it is a faulty

principle "29
.

In addition, however, Peterson suggests that Aris-

28ibid.

,

p.

77.

29 ibid

,

p.

114.

.
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totle goes on to specify just what conditions are necessary
for substitut ivity (salva veritate) in propositional know-

ledge contexts.

remark that

She finds these conditions in Aristotle's

— as

she expresses it at one point

—

"

only

...

if things are not different in respect of substance and

are one thing do all the same things belong to them" (SE
179 a 37 - 39

)

.

30

Thus, Peterson proposes, interchangeability

of two designators, Ei and E 2

,

in propositional knowledge

contexts, is held by Aristotle to be truth-preserving only
in cases in which

rEl

is not different in respect of substance and is
one thing with £ 2^

is true. 31

But how are we to determine whether this last

condition holds?

In response to this,

Peterson directs

our attention to SE 179bI-2:

For it is not the same thing for the good to be [the]
good and to be going to be asked about, nor for the
one approaching or masked to be [the one] approaching
and to be Coriscus.
These remarks, says Peterson, may be taken to suggest a
Peterson takes Aristotle's
30ibid., pp. 107-108.
She does, however, allow
remark to amount to at least this.
that Aristotle may have intended to state the biconditional
All the same things belong to x and to y if and only if
x and y are not different in respect of sub(a)
stance
and
(b)
x and y are one thing (with each other).
Yet I find her defence of this latter point unconvincing.
3^-

Ibid

.

,

p

.

136

.
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test for the satisfaction of
r Ei is not

different in respect of substance and is

one thing with E 2 1

.

That is, Peterson thinks that Aristotle is here proposing
the principle
If r E 2 is not different in respect of substance and
is one thing with E2~ is true then r to be Ex is to
be E 2" is true. 32
7

Thus, to summarize, Peterson’s interpretation is
that interchangeability of two expressions. Ex and E 2

,

in

knowledge contexts requires that
r

Eq is not different in respect of substance and is
one thing with E 2 1
*

And the truth of this latter sentence requires

be true.

the truth of
"

r

to be Ex is to be E 2

1
.

So interchangeability of Ex and E 2 in knowledge contexts

will be legitimate only if
r

1
to be Ex is to be E 2

In Peterson's own words,

is true.

substitutivity in one kind of non-extensional
context is made a necessary condition of substitutivity in another kind of non-extensional context,
Aristotle requires
Aristotle.
according to
contexts
knowledge
in
that expressions substitutable
in resdifferent
is not
are also substitutable in
'.3
be
to
is
and 'to be
pect of substance from
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

'

’

The Coriscus Puzzle, then, on Peterson's inter32 Ibid
33 ibid

.

p.

1^9.

uo
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pretation of Aristotle, is generated- by an appeal to the
fallacious principle, SP

.

In his solution to the puzzle,

Peterson’s Aristotle not only argues that the principle is
false; but he also states a condition that would have to
be met before
(*0

You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one
in the market

could be derived from
(2)

You do not know that the one approaching is the
darkest one in the market,

(3)

Coriscus is the one approaching.

and

That condition is that
To be Coriscus is to be the one approaching

would have to be true

— which,

Peterson, is not the case.

of course, according to

Thus, in addition to arguing

that SP is the faulty principle in the Coriscus Puzzle, we

might say that Peterson’s Aristotle has tried to explain
why it is so.
#

#

#

Plainly, the substitutivity interpretation brings

Aristotle very much up-to-date.

For it has him concerned

with current problems of referential opacity, or, more
specifically, substitutivity of identity in propositional

knowledge contexts.

But there are a few points that suggest

that we would do well to reflect a little further before

23

saddling Aristotle with this particular interpretation.
First, let me make some general remarks about

Peterson's reconstruction of the Coriscus argument.

As

Peterson herself acknowledges, her own reconstruction—
A2

— is

quite different from the literal version of Aris-

totle's argument— Al.

Whereas the literal version has

each of the various occurrences of 'know' followed simply
by a singular term, on Peterson's reconstruction each

occurrence of 'know' is followed by a
This raises,

I

'

that -clause
'

think, some question as to whether

Peterson’s interpretation is starting off on the right
track.

Clearly, Peterson's reconstruction is designed to

set the stage for an interpretation that has Aristotle

dealing with the problem of the intersubst itutivity of

co-designative expressions in propositional knowledge contexts.

But, as nice as it might be to find Aristotle

undertaking such a project, it is not at all clear to me
that this is what he is doing.

As indicated already, there

is no hint in the relevant passages that Aristotle is here

concerned with "propositional knowledge contexts"

— in

fact

the evidence is to the contrary; nor is there, as far as

can see, any suggestion of a worry specifically about the

"inter substitutivity of co-designative expressions" in

epistemic contexts.
later chapter. 3^
3^See Ch. IV.

But

I

shall say more about this in a

I

A second reservation that I have about the sub-

stitutivity interpretation concerns Peterson's charac-

terization of the sophist's principle.

As she under-

stands it, that principle is Aristotle's version of Leibniz' Law.

Aristotle's way out of the Coriscus Puzzle,

then, involves the denial of Leibniz' Law.

However,

Peterson herself is puzzled by the fact that earlier, in
Topics 152a33ff*, Aristotle says,
[If it is alleged that a and b are the same, one
ought] to consider them on the basis of what are
accidents to them and those things to which they are
accidents.
For such things as are accidents to the
one ought also to be accidents to the other.
(Peterson's translation)

And later, at 152b25ff

.

,

he adds that

[If It Is alleged that a and b are the same, one
ought] to speak generally, to consider, on the basis
of what are predicated of each of them in any way whatsoever, and on the basis of those things of which these
are predicated, whether there is a disagreement anywhere.
For such things as are predicated of the one
(Petersen's
ought also to be predicated of the other.
translation)

Such passages, Peterson thinks, clearly indicate an endorsement of Leibniz' Law.

And thus, as she sees it, there seems

to be a conflict between Aristotle's views on Leibniz'

in Topics and De Sophisticis Elenchis

this difficulty at some length.

.

Law

Peterson discusses

But ultimately she con-

cludes that Aristotle is here being plainly inconsistent,

although, she adds, "It is not clear whether he [Aristotle]
is changing his mind about the doctrine of the Topics

,
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or whether he is unwittingly contradicting
himself. "35

Peterson, then, like White, thinks that there
is a

problem in reconciling what Aristotle says about the
Coriscus Puzzle (in SE) with what he has said earlier
in
Topics, 152a33ff.

and 152b25ff.

But such allegations of

inconsistency seem to me to leave at least some question as
to whether the relevant passages have been properly
under-

stood

.

Finally, we should perhaps consider, briefly, how
well Aristotle comes out on the view attributed to him by

Peterson's substitutivity interpretation.

Peterson tells us that Aristotle's diagnosis of
the flaw in the Coriscus argument is that an illegitimate

substitution has been made between the lines
(2)

You do not know that the one approaching is the
darkest one in the market

(4)

You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one
in the market.

and

The sophist has substituted 'Coriscus' for 'the one

approaching' simply on the strength of the premiss
(3)

Coriscus is the one approaching

According to Peterson, Aristotle points out that the
mere identity statement

— (3) — is

not sufficient to guaran-

tee intersubstitutivity salva veritate in knowledge contexts

such as (2) and (4).

And she goes on to suggest that what

35peterson, op.cit.

p.

142.
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Aristotle requires is, in fact, that "expressions substitutable in knowledge contexts be also substitutable in
is n °t different in respect of substance from

'

’

to be

is not

'"

is to be

—a

and

'

condition that Aristotle thinks

satisfied by 'Coriscus' and 'the one approaching'.
But some would argue

— rightly,

I

think

— that

a

sufficient condition for the truth of
r

You (do not) know that

o<

is

(p

is that
r

You (do not) know that

p is

cp'1

and
r

You know that

be true.
(4)

o<

is p~

Thus, to derive

You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one
in the market,

it seems that all we need is
(2)

You do not know that the one approaching is the
darkest one in the market

together with the additional premiss
You know that Coriscus is the one approaching.
And, if this is correct, then the truth of
to be Coriscus is to be the one approaching
is clearly not a necessary condition for the interchange-

ability of 'Coriscus' and 'the one approaching' in the

premisses of the Coriscus argument. 36

More generally, the

36i am assuming, of course, that
You know that Coriscus is the one approaching

27

truth of
r

to be

cy

is to be jP

is not a necessary condition for the interchangeability
of
cy

and

in prepositional knowledge contexts.

p,

Peterson's Aristotle, then, may be talking about
very up-to-date issues; but this aspect of his solution
is clearly an unfortunate one.

And again, it seems to me,

this provokes the question, "Is Aristotle really committed
to the view here ascribed to him?"

A Final Criticism of Both the Indiscernibility

and the Substitutlvity Interpretati on
I

have raised a number of difficulties with respect

to each of the interpretations under discussion.

But there

remains one important worry that concerns both the indis-

cernibility and the substitutivity interpretations.
It should be kept in mind that, as mentioned al-

ready, Aristotle's discussion of the Coriscus Puzzle takes

place in the context of an attempt to classify and provide

solutions for various kinds of fallacies.

The argument

that gives rise to the Coriscus Puzzle is said by Aristotle
to fall into the class of arguments that commit the "fallacy

of accidence"

(rro^ooc

to

cru ^ p

5).

The Coriscus Puzzle,

then, is taken to be just one of a number of paradoxes all

of which may be resolved in the same way:

does not imply
to be Coriscus is to be the one approaching.

28

TTpoj
rj

Se.

o<^vrj

Tou^

TTocpOf'

TO

crujA&E.pr^Koj

Au cri,^ ir^ooy 0 T 0<VTCX
<1

pc# ^EV

<5

(With respect to arguments from accidence, one and
the same solution [suffices] for all.)
(SE 179a26-2?)

Without undertaking, at this point, to say any

more about the solution referred to here, let me make an

observation about the list of arguments to which Aristotle
claims it is applicable.

There is, in addition to the

Coriscus Puzzle, at least one other paradox of accidence
that involves epistemic contexts.

However, as will become

plain in the next chapter, the majority of Aristotle’s
examples have nothing to do with epistemic contexts.

In

fact, it is not at all obvious, at least at first glance,

just how these sophisms might have been thought by Aris-

totle to bear any significant resemblance to the Coriscus

Puzzle at all.
But whether or not it is evident to us that

Aristotle's various examples resemble each other, it is
clear that a necessary condition for the correctness of
any proposed interpretation of Aristotle's solution to the

Coriscus Puzzle is that a somewhat reasonable case can be
made for the applicability of that solution, so interpreted,
to each of the other sophisms.

I

myself fail to see how

either of the foregoing interpretations might be thought to
meet this condition.
Thus

I

am inclined to think that we must retrace

our steps, and, after setting out the various examples of

paradoxes of accidence, proceed from there to try to de-

29

velop an interpretation that, among other things,
lends
some plausibility to Aristotle’s contention
that "one and
the same solution [suffices] for all."
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CHAPTER II

••

ARISTOTLE'S EXAMPLES OP ARGUMENTS PROM ACCIDENCE
Sources
De Sophisticis Elenchis contains a number of allu-

sions to various examples of arguments from accidence.
But although some of these arguments are laid out in full,

not all are.

In fact some of them are simply referred to

by expressions such as

you know that which
'-Ct*

oA <y'<xK<-5

a few?'). ^

ohCycx.

I

'olScjj 8 ^L.\)\co

oe

('Do

'

;

am going to ask you about?' )1 and

o\iyc\

;'

('Is a few taken a few times

Consequently, even before one approaches the

task of trying to understand why Aristotle classified his

various examples as sophisms

"ttcxyoci

to

crvyLfStpyjKof y

"

one

must look around for clues that might indicate, at least
roughly, how each of them should be formulated.

Aside from the text of De Sophisticis Elenchis
itself, where are we to find such clues to the reconstruc-

tion of Aristotle's examples?

In what follows, I have

relied upon three main groups of sources.
First, there is a limited amount of ancient

literature that contains reference to and discussion of
what appear to be "stock'
time.

1

examples of sophisms of the

Of particular relevance to Aristotle's examples of

1SE 179a332SE 179a35.
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the fallacy of accidence are Plato

s’
'

Euthvdemus and

Diogenes Laertius' Lives of Emine nt Philosophers

.

Second, a number of Mediaeval treatises contain

suggestions about how Aristotle's examples might be construed

— e.g.

William of Sherwood's Introduc tiones in

Logic am ^ and Duns Scotus' Quaestiones in L ibros Elencnorum.5

And here one should also mention L. M. De Rijk's Logica
Modernum:

A Contribution to the History of Early Term-

inist Logic (Vol. 1)6 which, among other things, incorpo-

rates valuable textual material.
Finally,

I

have taken account of several more re-

cent translations of and commentaries on De Sophisticis

Elenchis

.

These include works by Poste,7 Tricot, 8 Joseph,?

3lt should be added that both the Euthydemus and
the Lives of Eminent Philosophers are valuable sources for
examples of other fallacies too.

^William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic tr.
with introduction and notes by Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis
University of Minnesota Press, 1966), pp 150-153*
,

.

5john Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Elenchorum
Omnia (Paris: Vives^ 1891), Q.uns XLIII - XLIX
Opera
vol. 2,
,

,

A Contribution
De Rijk, Logica Modernum:
(As sen
(vol~
I)
Terminlst
Logic
Early
of
to the History
Comp.
N.
V.,
1962).
Koninklijke Van Gorcum and

^L.

M.

,

^Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies or the
1866).
Sophistici Elenchi (London: Macmillan and Co
.

,

Organon VI: Les Refutations
Tricot, Aristote:
J. Vrin, i 960).
Librairie
Sophistiques (Paris:
8 j.

9h. W.
1916).

B.

Joseph, An Introduction to Logic

(Oxford,
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Peterson, 10 and Hamblin. 11
The Epistemic Paradoxes

Two of Aristotle’s examples of paradoxes of acci-

dence might be labelled ’’epistemic," since they both involve the concept of knowledge.
is the Coriscus Puzzle.

The other will be referred to as

the "Do you know that which
The Coriscus Puzzle

approaching ?"

One of these, of course,

I

.

am going to ask you about?"
or the "Do you know the one

Aristotle first refers to the Coriscus

Puzzle at SE 179a3^.

The reference is made simply by way

of the question "o<p> olSctj tov TTpoo-(6 vtcx

.

.

.

;"

As indicated already, at the outset of the previous chap-

ter, a clue to the way the argument proceeds is found at

179b3-4:
ol&cx, tov Kop ctkoVj oryVoco <5e rov*
cxuTOV olc^c* kcc( cfyv'ocu
Tov'
TT/OOCr coVTc*,
it is not the case that if I know Coriscus,
(.
.

.

ouk

.

(.

•

.

.

but do not know the one approaching, that I know and
do not know the same thing.)
and, on the basis of this, the following reconstruction

seems,
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

have suggested, reasonable:

I

You know Coriscus.
You do not know the one approaching.
Coriscus is the one approaching.
You know and you do not know the same thing.

Peterson, The Masker Paradox
Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton, 1969).
10 S

.

L.

ll C

.

L.

Co., 197°).

Hamblin, Fallacies

(London:

(unpublished

Methuen and

33

There are, however, two brief additional remarks
about this reconstruction that should be made at this

point
First, some have urged that the verb ’know’, in
its various occurrences throughout the Coriscus argument,

might be taken to be equivocal.

For example, Poste sug-

gests that "The fallacy seems really equivocation, a con-

fusion between the two senses of knowledge, old acquaintance, and recognition oh a particular occasion. "12
But, as Peterson has pointed out, had Aristotle conceived
of the Coriscus Puzzle in this way, we should expect him
to have included it under the heading of paradoxes "u&ioa.

X
ing. 13

i

c<

y

"

(

equivocation

Yet he does not.

)

or some other such head-

,

Thus, in the interests of pre-

senting a reconstruction of the paradox which is faithful
to Aristotle’s concerns, it seems to me that we should re-

quire that the verb ’know', in all of its occurrences

throughout the argument, be taken to have

a

single meaning.

Second, however, although one might avoid the trap

of casting Aristotle's paradox as a paradox of equivocation
on 'know', one might, nevertheless, be tempted to suppose
that the sentences containing 'know' are really elliptical
for sentences containing somewhat more complicated con-

^Edward Poste,
13 S

.

L.

op cit
.

.

Peterson, op cit
.

p.

,

.

,

156.
p.

26.
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structions.

For instance, one might think that, e.g.,

You know Coriscus

should be treated as elliptical for
You know who Coriscus is,
or

You know that Coriscus is such-and-suchl4
or perhaps even something like

You know, with respect to certain properties that are
essential to Coriscus and to no one else, that Coriscus
is the man who has these properties 15
.

For then, since
You know who

.

.

.

is

etc., are well-recognized opaque contexts, it might be held

that it becomes clearer how it is possible for all of the

premisses of the Coriscus Puzzle to be true together. 16
But whatever the merits of such an approach, and

l^Recall (as outlined in my Chapter I) Peterson’s
suggestion about the rejection of
You know Coriscus
in favor of
You know who Coriscus is,
and the subsequent transition from the latter to
You know that Coriscus is [e.g.] the darkest one in the
market
l^This analysis of 'You know Coriscus’ is to be
found in Chisholm’s "The Logic of Knowing," p. 791, where
he (Chisholm) sketches what he calls "the traditional solution" to the Coriscus Puzzle.
l6in The Masker Paradox 19ff*, Peterson in fact
argues that unless one formulates the argument in such a way
as to avoid having the several occurrences of ’know’
followed simply by singular terms, it cannot be the case
that all the premisses of the argument are true together.
See my Chapter I.
,
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however appealing such a move might be to a contemporary
philosopher, there is no evidence that Aristotle was,
himself, inclined to think in such terms.

He seems to

view a sentence such as ’You know Coriscus' as simply

ascribing to coriscus the attribute, being known by you.
And this,

I

think, must be kept clearly in mind if we are

to understand the key features of Aristotle’s own solution

of the Coriscus Puzzle.
Th e ”Do you know that which

about ?

I

am going to ask you

Aristotle's other "epistemic" paradox of accidence

is mentioned at SE 179a33-3^.

the question,

”...

It

is referred to by way of

6 yu&AAco cr^ c^oj-c c*v;”

But

nowhere in the text is the argument stated in full.
AT 179bl-3, however, we are given a further hint
about the argument.
TCj

KoU y^e-AAovTc.

There Aristotle says,

OU totieoV
eyO U)'Co(CrQo< <_

e.O'Tcv’
>

ou &£,

c*yc*<9cJ
"CcO

Z* £(Vou

-TTyoocrtov-c

c

.

.

.

TT/OOO'tOV'CC Te Ccvai. Ko(l
K op(crxco
(But with respect to the good, it is not the same to
be the good and to be something about to be asked
[about]; nor with respect to the one approaching
is it the same for the one approaching to be, and for
Coriscus to be )
.

.

.

.

The latter part of this quotation warns us that to be (the
one) approaching is not the same as to be Coriscus; and the

former part tells us that to be (the) good is not the same
as to be (that which is) going to be asked about.

Thus,

just as ’the one approaching’ and ’Coriscus’ are key terms
in the Coriscus Puzzle, it seems reasonable to suppose that
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•that which

I

am going to ask you about’ and ’the good’

are key terms in the "Do you know that which

I

am going to

ask you about?"
Yet how, precisely, should the argument be recon-

structed?

instances

Since Aristotle treats his various examples as
of'

one and the same fallacy, it seems fair that

we should try, as far as possible, to formulate the argu-

ments in such a way that they resemble each other in form.
Thus, in attempting to reconstruct the "Do you know that

which

I

am going to ask you about?"

I

think we would do

well to take the Coriscus Puzzle as a model.
If we do adopt this approach, then it seems to

me that a quite straightforward version of the paradox

presently under discussion suggests itself.

It is

simply this:
You do not knew that which I am going to ask
you about. ^7
You know the good.
The good is that which I am going to ask you
about
You know and you do not know the same thing.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Of course, as

Puzzle,

I

I

did with respect to the Coriscus

should want to say of this paradox that the

17it should be noted here that I have followed
i.ptoTo^'j
as 'to
Poste and Peterson in translating
simply as 'to
it
translate
to
were
If
we
about
ask
is that which
good
'The
read
would
premiss
ask', then my
(3)
Interodd.
bit
sounds
a
this
and
you’
ask
I am going to
really
Peterson
nor
Poste
neither
estingly enough, however,
need the addition of 'about' to make the corresponding
(Their
premisses of their reconstructions sound natural.
versions are to be found below.)
’

.

.

.

'

.

’
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meaning of ’know’, throughout, must be held
constant,
furthermore, there is, again, no suggestion that
Aristotle
thinks of,

e

.

g.

You know the good
as elliptical for a more complicated construction
such as

You know what the good is.
’You know the good’

says simply— on Aristotle’s

view— that

the good has the attribute, being known by you.

Other versions of the "Do you know that which

I

am

going to ask you about?" have, of course, been proposed.
For example, Poste has suggested that the argument is this:
You do not know what I am going to ask you about; I
am going to ask you about the nature of the Summum
Bonum; therefore you do not know the nature of the
Summum Bonum.

And Peterson has urged the following:
1.
2.
3

4.

You
ask
You
The
You

do not know [what] that which I am going to
you about [is].
do know [what] the good [is].
good is that which I am going to ask you about
both know and do not know the same thing 19

.

.

Note that

’know'

in premisses 1. and 2. of Peterson's

version is followed, not by a singular term, as my version
has it, but by '[what]

.

.

Yet, whatever her rea-

[is]'.

.

sons for introducing this more complicated construction
(and

I

suspect the reasons are similar to those for which

l^Edward Poste, op cit
.

19s. L.

Peterson, op cit
.

p.

.

.

,

73*
p.

42.
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she did the same with respect to the Coriscus Puzzle), 20
it seems to me that, as stated before, such an
addition to

what we actually find in the text is unwarranted, and
may,

perhaps, even tend to obscure the way Aristotle's own

solution proceeds.
Poste's reconstruction, on the other hand, is

consonant with mine in the respect just mentioned.
is, ’know'

is followed,

singular term.

That

in each of its occurrences, by a

Of course, as it is formulated above,

Poste's argument is a_uite different from Peterson's as

well as from mine.

In fact,

it appears to be, at best, a

sub-inference of the argument as Peterson and
it.

I

construe

But it would not take much to fill out Poste's sug-

gestion in such a way as to bring it into line with these
others.

Retaining the key terms of Poste's argument, it

might be reformulated as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
.*,(4)

You do not know what I am going to ask you about.
You know the nature of the Summum Bonum.
The nature of the Summum Bonum is what I am going
to ask you about.
You know and you do not know the same thing.

And, in that case, Poste's version would differ from my own
in only minor respects. 21

20s.

my Chapter

L.

Peterson, op clt
.

.

,

pp.

18-36.

See also

I.

—

2^1 can see no justification nor, for that matter,
need for introducing, as Poste does, the expression 'the
nature of

—

'

39

The Diversity Paradoxes
In De Sophisticis Elenchis

Aristotle’s first

,

remarks on the fallacy of accidence are found at l66b28ff.
In addition to a brief statement of what the fallacy
is,

Aristotle there provides two examples of arguments that commit that fallacy.

I

shall call these sophisms "the di-

versity paradoxes."
The First Diversity Paradox

.

SE l66b33-34 contains

a clear statement of the first diversity paradox:

...£<•

O

Ko plcrKOS £T£|OOV kvGpc^rtov,
CcTTc.

OCJTV05

Y^P

oioTOU

ocu-COt,

•

.if Coriscus

is other than man, he is other
than himself; for he is (a) man.)
(.

The

'

.

ec

’

suggests that

’

c

£-£yoov c<vdp6'Rou'

Kop(cn<o 5

premiss.

Likewise, the 'yap' indicates that

avGpujTToj'

is a premiss.

’

zcr-cl

is a
.

.

.

The conclusion, then, seems

clearly to be Vut 05 <wurou

e.'czpo^'

.

Thus, when translated and arranged in the form of
an argument, the sophism is this:

Coriscus is other than man
He is (a) man
.-.He is other than himself;
or, replacing the pronouns,

Coriscus is other than man
Coriscus is (a) man
.-.Coriscus is other than Coriscus.
Poste offers a slightly different version from the
one just presented.

He translates the first premiss as

'a

40

man is not Coriscus'. 22

That is, he treats ’(a) man',

instead of 'Coriscus', as the subject.

As far as

I

can

see, from a philosophical point of view, this difference
is of little or no significance 23

Yet, since, in the text,

.

we find

'

o

Kojoco-koj'

(nominative case) and

(genitive of comparison

lation to Poste's.

— ’than

man'),

'

ocmQjO

ujttou

*

prefer my own trans-

I

2^

But Poste's premiss has another feature that mine

does not.

In his first premiss,

indefinite article.

'man'

is preceded by the

In mine, it is not.

Thus, whereas

my version of the first premiss seems to have the force of

something like 'Coriscus is other than the species man',
Poste's version suggests something more like 'Coriscus is

other than some man'
Of course, classical Greek does not have an in-

definite article.
^ 2 Edward

So closer inspection of the text is not

Poste, op cit
.

.

,

p.

13.

2

3to clarify, I mean that (as I shall urge later)
Aristotle seems to regard 'Coriscus is other than (a) man'
as attributing "otherness-with-respec t-to-Coriscus ' to (a)
And I presume that he would allow that '(A) man is
man.
other than Coriscus' does the same.
2i|

Poste, however, is not alone in reading the premiss
under consideration in the way that he does. The author (s)
of the Summa Sophist icorum Elencorum (edited by De Rijk, and
contained in Logica Ifodernorum Vol. I) represented the
argument in this way:
Coriscus est homo
homo autem est alter a Corisco quia Socrates ergo
p.
(De Rijk, op c it
Coriscus est alter a Corisco.
mine).
is
the emphasis
356
,

,

.

—

nl

likely to resolve this latter difference between Poste’s

version of the first premiss and my own.

25

Moreover,

since both readings are true, each seems, in this respect,
to be qualified to serve as a premiss of the sophism.

Thus, in view of the fact that it is not clear

just how the first premiss is to be understood

— whether

as

Coriscus is other than man,
or as

Coriscus is other than some man
I

shall leave the question open, and indicate this by in-

serting a parenthesized ’some’.

My proposal for the re-

construction of the first diversity paradox, then, is
this

:

Coriscus is other than (some) man.
Coriscus is (a) man.
Coriscus is other than Coriscus.

(1)
(2)
.*.(3)

The Second Diversity Paradox

Immediately following

.

his statement of the first diversity paradox, Aristotle

presents a second, slightly different, sophism:

X
£T£OOV

O(\^0pcOTTOO

zzz.pos

7

o Sz, XcjKpcx'trrj^ otvQpurT05,

CJploAoyrj/<£.'w

,

OC(.

...

if (he, it) is other than Socrates, and Socrates
(
is (a) man, they say that it has been agreed that (he.
.

.

.

if Aristotle had wanted to make it clear
that the proposition intended is that Coriscus Is other than
o Kop<.crKos e-repo v 01^05
some man, he might have said
But the fact that he did not is not, by itself,
kvepAno u
a convincing argument against the view that this is in fact
25 0f course,

’

’

.

what was intended.
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it) is other than man.)

(SE l66b34-35)

Again,

ohe

indicates that

is a premiss; the

Zvep^iroy

'

.

.

'Si' suggests that

.

^coKpci'Couj Lteoo^'

'

6

.

.

.

Zco,<p^ 5

ls additional information, and, hence,
another

premiss; and the

'^o-^ wpoAo y^K^vcu’

has been agreed’) makes it clear that
is the conclusion.

(’they say that it

'ecepov

lotto u

1

These clues provide at least a start

toward reconstruction of the sophism

— viz.

...

.*•

is other than Socrates.
Socrates is (a) man.
is other than man.
•

•

•

But what is the implicit subject of the first premiss and
the conclusion?

There seem to be two possibilities.

Some have taken the subject to be ’man'.

Thus,

on this view, the second diversity paradox is this:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Man is other than Socrates.
Socrates is (a) man.
Man is other than man. 26

Most, however, have assumed that the subject is ’Coriscus’.
And, consequently, they have taken the argument to be
(1)
(2)
.*.(3)

Coriscus is other than Socrates.
Socrates is (a) man.
Coriscus is other than man. 27

26According to Peterson, the author of [Alexandri
in Llbros Elenchorum Vo 1
II of Commentarla In Aristotelem
Graeca (39, 33-40 , 2) and "the anonymous paraphrast"
(Sophonias
Vol. XXIII of Comm. Graeca ), understood the
argument in this way.
,

.

,

27peterson lists, as
the argument, Poste, Tricot,
and Pseudo-Scotus
However,
and the authors of the Glose
.

supporters of this version of
Pickard-Cambridge Forster Ross
we can add to this list Hamblin
in Arist. Soph. El. (De Rijk,
,

,
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Again, unfortunately, there seem to
be no textual
clues sufficient to resolve this issue
beyond doubt.
However, I am inclined to think that,
since 'Coriscus' is
the subject of the remarks immediately
preceding the pre-

sentation of the second diversity paradox, it
is perhaps
more natural to suppose that the unstated
subject in that

paradox is the same

— i.e.

'Coriscus'.

Nevertheless,

later, in my discussion of Aristotle's solution
to the

second diversity paradox,

I

shall take account of both

readings
A Further Comment on the Second Reading; of the

Second Diversity Paradox

.

Although

I

tend to favor the

second reading of the second diversity paradox over the
first reading, there is a feature of that version that

should perhaps be noted.

It will be recalled that the

first premiss of the first diversity paradox is
o

Kopec- ko 5

erepov «v0pc6rrou

But if 'Coriscus'

— 'o

Ko pio-Ko^'-— is taken to be the

implicit subject of the second diversity paradox, then the

conclusion of that paradox appears to be the same as the
216) and the Summa Sophist icorum Elencorum (De Rijk,
Perhaps"^ too
William of Sherwood revealed his sym356).
pathy for this second version of the argument when he stated
the parallel example,
a Sorte est Plato alter.
Sortes est homo.
Ergo ab homine est Plato alter.
to Logic
tr. Norman Kretzmann, p. 150)
( Introduct ion
p.
p.

,

first premiss of the first diversity paradox.

Yet aren’t

the premisses of these paradoxes supposed to
be true, and
the conclusions false?
As stated earlier, it seems to me that what is

intended by the first premiss of the first diversity

paradox is either that Coriscus is other than the species
man or that Coriscus is other than some man; and both of
these propositions are plainly true.

Yet, since the

conclusion of the second diversity paradox is presumably
taken to be false, the sentence in question must have at
least one other reading.

Is there,

then, an alternative

interpretation on which it is false?
In Plato’s Euthydemus

,

there is a delightful

passage that deals with the hazards of ’sfeoo^’.
Socrates is being subjected to a classic piece of sophistry
by Dionysodorus

Then, said [Dionysodorus], Chaeredemus was other than
the father?
Than mine, I said.
Then w as a father being other than a father? Are you
the same as the stone?
I'm afraid you may prove me so, I said, but I don’t
think I am.
Then you are other than the stone? said he.
Other to be sure, said I.
Then being other than a stone, said he, you are not
And being other than gold you are not gold.
a stone?
That is all true.
So then Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a
father, would not be a father.
It seems, I said, that he is not a father.
I suppose if Chaeredemus is a
Euthydemus now chimed in:
father, Sophroniscus again being other than a father
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is not a father,

so that you,

fatherless

Socrates are

The point of interest here, of course,
is the play on
sentences of the form 'x is other than
(an) F'
When
.

Socrates allows that Chaeredemus is other
than a father,
he means that Chaeredemus is not his
father.

Yet, as

the discussion continues, Socrates is
led to accept the

stronger— and false— proposition that Chaeredemus
father at all

— i.e.

is not a

that Chaeredemus is other than each and

every father.

Returning, then, to the second diversity paradox,
we were looking for a reading of
o

KopCcn<o^

•

exapov

oivOjOojttou

on which it might be regarded as false.

passage suggests one.

The Euthydemus

There it is made clear that, in some

cases
.

.

.

is other than

(an) F

might be understood as
.

.

.

is not

.

.

.

is other than (each and every) F.

(an) F

or

Hence,

Coriscus is other than (a) man
2®Plato, Euthydemus 298a, tr. W. H. D. Rouse, in
The Collected Dialogues of Plato (including the Letters),
ed
EL Hamilton and H. Cairns (Hew York:
Random House Inc.,
1961), pp. 385-420.
,

.

,
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might be taken to mean

Coriscus is not (a) man
or

Coriscus is other than (each and every)
man.
Thus, just as there are readings
of

°

^Op'-O'JKO^

E.'C

£.po\>

cKvOp COTTOU

on which it is true, and, as a
result, might qualify as a
premiss of a paradox, so there is at
least one reading on

which it is absurd, and hence might
serve as the conclusion
of a paradox.

The Possessive Paradoxes
In addition to the epistemic and diversity

sophisms, Aristotle's list of paradoxes of accidence in-

cludes a number of examples whose key terms include

possessive adjectives.

Following Peterson,

I

shall call

these sophisms "the possessive paradoxes."
The "Is the dog your father?"

totle refers to the

"cxo^

o

kuojv

At SE 179a35, Aris-

rrc<f'p|0 ;"

sophism.

The

allusion is, undoubtedly, to an argument to be found in
Plato's Euthvdemus

.

The sophist, Dionysodorus

,

is

speaking
Just tell me [Ctesippus], have you a dog?
Yes, and a very bad one, said Ctesippus.
Has he got puppies?
Very much so, he said, as bad as he is.
Then the dog is their father?
I have seen him myself, he said, on the job with the
bitch
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Very well, isn’t the dog yours?
Certainly, he said.
hS 13 y ° UrS

ySu?

S°

’

the d0g beoomes

(298d-4)

The

sophist's argument, in essence, seems to be this:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The dog is your own.
The dog is a father.
The dog is your own father. 30

And, in fact, although Aristotle’s allusion to
the argument
at SE 179a35 is suggestive of only the conclusion,
at

179bl4-15 he refers to the argument again, this time by

actually mentioning the premisses:
iTc<T'jp

)

ecrr c

St

o'S’p

"

cl

c&e iarl

”
.

In view of these considerations, then, there seems

to be little room for disagreement over the formulation of

the "Is the dog your father?"

Certainly Buridan,31

Forster, 32 Pcste,33 and ?seudo-Scotus34 present the argument
2 9The

translation is W. H. D. Rouse's (in The
Collected Dialogues of Plato ed Hamilton and Cairns )
.

,

3°I have introduced the expression, ’your own',
because it unlike simply ’your’
can be used' in both (1)
and (3).
(i.e. 'your own'
unlike 'your'
can both stand
alone (as in (1)), and be used to precede a general term
(as in (3)).
In this respect, 'your own' more closely resembles the Greek,
<r 6^'.

—

—

—

—

'

31<John Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth
translated and with an introduction by T. K. Scott (New York
Appleton-Century-Crof ts 19 66), p. 121.
,

,

32Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations
Forster (Loeb ed.), p. 122 fn. (a).

33Edward Poste, op clt
.

.

,

3^John Duns Scotus, op cit
.

73-

p.
.

,

Ch.

XXIV.

,

tr.

E.

S.
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in much the same way as I have.

However, some have sug-

gested a different statement of the
argument.

For example,

Hamblin, at one point, offers the
following formulation:
The do is yours.
The dog is a father.
The father is yours. 35

(1)
(2)

,

.*.(3)

And, in fact, in his first statement
of the paradox, Joseph
does the same. 36

The difference between the latter version
and the

former may, at first glance, seem slight.

But when I come

to discuss Aristotle's solution to
the possessive para-

doxes,

shall try to show that there are convincing rea-

I

sons for preferring

the former, more literal version.

The "Is the statue your work?"
crov icrrtv

sppov

.

.

.

The

"...

o

("Is the statue your

";

work?") SE 1793 3 ^, is simply a variation of the "Is the
dog
.

your father?"
The way the sophism was thought to proceed is sug-

gested by Aristotle's remarks at 179b4-6:
>

C,

OUO
Zpyov, epov

.

.

.

>

£,(.

^

’

,

TOUT’

'

*

v

£cr Tlv' cpiov,
,

£o-ccv’

.

.

1/

8CTXC

f

.

nor if this is my own, and this is a work, is
it my own work
(.

.

.

.

.

.

Assuming that 'rout”, here, refers to the statue (o
?

C

\

.

) ,

the argument, then, seems to be this:

35c, L. Hamblin, op cit
.

36 H.

W.

B.

.

Joseph, op cit
.

p.

,

.

,

86
p.

.

587.

49
vl)

The statue is my own.
e Sta ^ ue is (a) work.
m^
The statue is my own work.

-

.rol

Again, the worriesome conclusion
results from
combining a possessive adjective—
this time
ny
own-) instead of cr£v (-your
own')-with an expression-

'^ov

.

(

'

in this case,

tpyov

'

(

-work-

)— that

is predicated

(truly) of the subject.

The "Is this your child?"

Finally, at l80a5-8,

Aristotle provides one further example of
a possessive
paradox of accidence.
The text is this:
voa
Toutg crov
eerxt
tou xo tckvov;
XouXo Te.xv'ov o-cc. croup Lar)K£.\> OkVcx c kcx\ crov
T £,KVOv
o
OU C oV X&KVOV,

ecr-rc

crov

.

;

apex.

,

;

,

oc'

this your own? Yes.
And is this a child? Then
your own [is] this child; because it hapoens to be
both your own and a child, but it is not’ your own
child. )
.(Is

The Questions,
own?’) and

1

*

e.o"c c

.

.

.

.

.

.

ecrx

<.

xouxo

cre v

’

;

(’Is this your

xouxo tskvov’; (’Is this

a child?’)

presumably indicate the premisses of the sophism:
(1)
(2)

Thi s is your own.
This is a child.

And, taking account of the remark,

t£kvov,"

"...

0 u crov

it seems clear that the inference to which Aris-

totle is objecting is from (1) and (2) to
(3)

This is your own child.

Thus, the form of the "Is this your own child?" is the same
as that of the other "possessive paradoxes."
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However, in presenting the "Is this your
child?"
Aristotle makes some further remarks that
are perhaps

worth noting at this point.

In the previous paragraph,

claimed that Aristotle objects to the inference
from (1)
and (2) to (3).
Not all agree with this.
For example, in
translating the section quoted above, E. S. Forster
I

ex-

presses Aristotle's view as follows:
’Is A yours?'

'Yes'.
'Is A a child?’
'Yes’.
'Then
your child', for he happens to be both yours and
child; but for all that he is net 'your child' .37

A is
a.

Here Forster suggests that Aristotle's view is that
whereas
'A

is your child'

child',

'A

follows from

is yours'

'A

is "your child"' does not.

I

and

'A is a

take Forster's

use of quotation marks around the second occurrence of

'your child' in this passage to indicate that he thinks

that we must be careful to distinguish between two different senses of that expression-i

.

e

.

'your child' is, as

Forster interprets Aristotle, ambiguous.
such that

'A

is your child'

One sense is

does follow from the premisses

in question; the other is such that it does not.

But it seems to me that Forster's translation mis-

represents Aristotle's view on this matter.

In 179b38ff

.

Aristotle in fact mentions that some attempt to solve the

possessive paradoxes by appealing to the notion of ambiguity.

Yet he goes on to state that

"...

no one says,

3?Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations

Forster (Loeb ed

.

) ,

p.

125.

,

tr.

E.

S.
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properly, 38 that this is so-and-so's child, if so-and-so
is [e.g.,] master of the child.

.

.

that Aristotle is of the opinion that
has a single sense

— presumably

This suggests
'A is B's

child',

that sense in which it is

true just in case A was conceived by B.39

Nevertheless, Aristotle does seem to endorse the

inference from (1) and (2) to
O-OV

.

.

.

TOUTO

t^KVOV.

How are we to explain this?

I

suspect that the explanation

is simply that this sentence ought not to be translated as

Forster translates it
(3)

— i.e.

This is your child.

Rather, we should translate it as
(4)

This child is yours.

That there is an important difference between

sentences such as (3) and (4) will be brought out in a
later chapter.^ 0

But, for now,

I

hope simply to have said

3^The entire passage in question is this:
Some also solve these reasonings, e.g. that this is
your father, or [that this is your] son, or [that this
is your] slave, by invoking the notion of ambiguity.
Yet it is clear that if the refutation depends upon many
meanings [literally, 'being said in many ways'] the term
or expressions ought to have several proper meanings
[literally 'ought to be said properly in several ways'];
but no one says, properly, that this is so-and-so's
child, if so-and-so is [e.g.] master of the child; but
the combination depends upon the accident [i.e. 'depends
upon the application of the fallacious principle of
accidence ]
'

^Chapter

V,

l42ff.
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enough to convince the reader that Aristotle
would not
have been sympathetic to the suggestion,
raised
by

Forster's translation, that one appropriate response
to
the "Is this your child?" might be to allow that,
on one

interpretation of (3), the argument is valid.
The "Is a Few Taken a Few Times a Few?"
The last example on Aristotle's list at SE 179a
33ff. is referred to as the

oA^tx;

"

re*

oA

1

^ k<5

b'Xtyoi

Unfortunately, however, there are no further

remarks in the text specifically about this paradox.
as far as

I

Nor,

have been able to determine, is this example

even mentioned in any other classical texts.

Hamblin says, "any explanation [of the "Is

Hence, as

few taken a

a

few times a few?"] must be quite conj ectural "^2
.

Nevertheless, there have been two relatively recent attempts to formulate this sophism.

Poste, in his

notes on De Sophisticis Elenchis XXIV, calls the argument
an "excentric syllogism. "^3

According to him, it goes

like this:
(1)
(2)

A four
A four

^ SE

multiplied by a four is a large number.
multiplied by a four is a four.

179a35.
L.

Hamblin, op cit
.

^3Edward Poste, op cit
.

.

.

,

p.

p.

86.

156.
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;.(3)

A four is a large number.

^

And the other attempt to formulate the
"Is a few taken a
few times a few?" that I have tracked
down is to be found
in Joseph's An_Int roductlon to Logic
Joseph takes the
.

argument to be this:
(1)
(2)
.'.(3)

Six is few.

Thirty-six is six times six.
Thirty-six is few. ^5
Later, in Chapter V,

these versions

I

shall comment on each of

It will be shown that there are compelling

.

reasons to doubt thao either is a satisfactory reconstruction of the argument that Aristotle had in mind.
that, however,

I

ment- — one which,

Following

shall propose my own version of the arguI

believe, comes considerably closer to

what Aristotle intended.
*

#

#

This, then, concludes my presentation of Aris-

totle’s list of paradoxes of accidence.

No doubt, they

seem to comprise a rather diverse collection.

^ Ibid

But in

Poste suggests that the example
p. 73.
,
is comparable to arguments such as
Oxygen combined with hydrogen is water.
(a)
Oxygen combined with hydrogen is oxygen.
/.Oxygen is water,
.

and

Oxygen is gaseous.
Oxygen combined with hydrogen is oxygen.
/.Oxygen combined with hydrogen is gaseous.
Of course, (a) is closer to Poste’s version of the "Is a
few taken a few times a few?" than (b).
(b)

^5h. W. B. Joseph, op.cit., p.

587.
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order to understand what they may have appeared to

Aristotle to have in common, we must examine more carefully the feature that he claims they share

examples of the fallacy of accidence.

— that

of being
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CHAPTER III
THE FALLACY OF ACCIDENCE

Aristotle's Characterization of the Fallacy
of Accidence
1

According to Edward Poste, "The fallacy
per accidens [i.e. the fallacy of accidence] has
been generally misunderstood, which seems to show that it is
an ill-defined
species." 1 I am inclined to agree that there
is quite a

history of misunderstanding about the fallacy
of accidence;
but

I

am not sure that it is entirely fair to say
that this

shows that the fallacy of accidence is an
"ill-defined

species."

At least, it seems to me that Aristotle does
try

to provide a formulation of the faulty principle
on which

arguments from accidence depend.

Admittedly, some of the

terminology in which that principle is couched is not as
clear as we might like it to be.

This, however, is not so

much a problem with the fallacy of accidence itself, as a

difficulty that pervades the entire Aristotelian corpus.
How does Aristotle attempt to characterize the

fallacy of accidence?

Consider his first statement about

arguments from accidence in De Sophisticis Elenchis

:

Fallacious arguments from accidence arise whenever it
is claimed that everything belongs in the same way
both to the subject and to its accidents.
(l66b28ff.)
The suggestion, here, is that the fallacy of accidence is

^Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies or t he
Sophlstici Elenchi (London: Macmillan and Co., 1866), p. 158.
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committed by any argument that
invokes, in the justification of some step of the argument,
a certain rule or
principle, viz.,
(1)

yth n b ® l0n S5 in the same way
to the sub?I®r andi f
ject
to its accidents.

Thus we have at least a sufficient
condition for commission
oi the fallacy of accidence:
an argument. A, commits the
fallacy of accidence if, in
justification of some step of
the argument,
us

(1)

is invoked.

But does Aristotle provide

any indication of what the necessary
conditions are
for committing the fallacy of accidence?
tfj.th

In his opening remarks on solving
paradoxes of

accidence. Aristotle says
With respect to arguments from accidence, one
and the
same solution [suffices] for all.
For, since it is
undetermined whether that which is said belongs to the
suoject whenever it belongs to the accident, and
since
in some cases it is thought to and said to,
but in
others this is said to be not necessary, we ought,
therefore, in all cases alike, when a conclusion has
been reached, say that it is not necessary.
(179a
26ff.)
The fact that Aristotle says that all arguments guilty of
the fallacy of accidence can be refuted in the same way

seems to be an indication that he thinks that there is
some fault that they all have in common.

An attempt to

specify that fault is to be found in the second sentence
of the above-quoted passage.

Arguments from accidence, we

are told, are to be refuted by pointing out that

"...

is undetermined whether that which is said belongs to the

it
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subject whenever it belongs to the
accident," or, in
other words, by rejecting the rule
or principle
A thing is said of a subject
whenever it belongs
b
to its accident.

(2)

One might be inclined to think, at
this point, that
(1)

and (2) simply say the same thing.

And, if one were

to suppose so, one would be in a
position to maintain that

not only does every argument that invokes
(1) commit the

fallacy ol accidence, but (since every argument
that commits the fallacy of accidence appeals to
(2), and

(2)

is

thought to be synonymous with (1)) every argument
that

commits the fallacy of accidence invokes (1).

In short,

invoking (1) is both a necessary and sufficient condition
for committing the fallacy of accidence.
But closer inspection reveals an important differ(1)

ence between vl) and (2).

Whereas (1) seems to require

that everything that belongs to a given subject belongs to
(2)
its accidents,
and conversely

,

(2) requires only that

everything that belongs to the accidents of the subject,
belongs to the subject.

To put the point in another way,

a natural rewrite of (1)

seems to be

'

If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x if and only if z belongs
to y).

However,
'

(2)

is most naturally read as simply

If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x if z belongs to y).

Thus while (1) goes over into a conditional whose consequent
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is a biconditional,

(2)

translates into a conditional

whose consequent is, itself, simply
a conditional

.

The question arises, then, whether
Aristotle wants
to characterize the fallacy of
accidence in terms of (i).
or just (2)
SE 166 d 28-30 suggests that
Aristotle has in
mind (1)*.
But the warning at 179a26ff. is
directed
?

.

simply against (2)'.

Is there any decisive consideration

that might help us to resolve this
matter?

I

think there

is

My own view is that Aristotle is simply
not as

precise as he should have been at 179a26ff.
passage, just before he states the principle,

In that
(2), Aris-

totle claims that all arguments from accidence can
be refuted in the same

way— namely,

by rejecting (2).

But, as

be made clear in a later chapter, there are some

arguments from accidence that do not make use of (2), although they do invoke the principle
If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x only if z belongs to y).3

(3)

In light of this, it seems to me that what Aristotle should

have said at 179a26ff. is not that all arguments from acci-

dence are to be refuted by rejecting (2), but that they are
2 The

difference that I am trying to bring out here
believe, evident, not only in my translation of the
relevant passages, but also in the translations of Forster
and Pickard-Cambridge
is,

I

3

See, especially. Chapter V.
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to be refuted by rejecting
either (2) or (3).
In other words,

invoking (2) is not a necessary

condition for committing the fallacy
of accidence.
But
invoking either (2) or (3) is. That
is, an argument
commits the fallacy of accidence only
if it invokes
either (2) or (3). And since— as
the examples in De
Sophisticis Elenchis also show— it is
clear that Aristotle
thinks that invoking either (2) or
(3) is a sufficient
condition for committing the fallacy of
accidence, the
appeal to (2) or (3) constitutes both the
necessary and
sufficient conditions for committing the fallacy.
it more precisely,

the view that

I

To put

am ascribing to Aris-

totle is this:
An argument, A, commits the fallacy of accidence
if
and only if A invokes either the principle (i)
if x
is a subject, and y is an accident of x, then
( z ) (
belongs to x if z belongs to y), or the principle (ii)
if x is a subject, and y is an accident
of x, then (z)(z belongs to x only if z belongs to
y).
We have thus taken a small step towards under-

standing the "ill-defined" fallacy of accidence.

What we

must tackle next are the semantic aspects of the prin-

ciples (i) and (ii; above.

In particular, we must investi-

gate the meaning of the expression

'

cru^^

('accident’) as it occurs in this context.

*

Before

I

take

up that matter, however, let me make some brief remarks

about the other two key terms involved
and

— viz.

'subject' and

'belongs to'

Perhaps the only point that need be made about the
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use of the word ’subject’

(Aristotle's

'

iT|Ocx

in

)

principles (i) and (ii) is that it designates
things --not
linguistic entities.

11

Among the things to which ’subject'

applies here are, for example, the designata of
such terms
as

'KopCcrKO^

and 'o Kuojv

’

’

(

’Coriscus

'

’

) ,

('the dog').

£

<*v<Sp^

’

(’the statue’),

In fact, after examining

Aristotle's various examples of arguments from accidence,
it will be clear that the subject, in each case,
is some-

th 11

^

that he

Aristotle

— would

most likely classify as

a

primary substance.
The expression 'belongs to'

somewhat more troublesome.

’

urr^o^ gu v

'

is

)

But let me make one or two re-

marks to indicate roughly how
W. and M.

(

I

Kr.eale note,

propose to treat the term.
in The Development of Logic

that Aristotle seems to regard certain

'

urr

v

»

(’be-

longs to’) sentences as interchangeable with a number of

other kinds of sentences in which that verb does not
appear.

More specifically, according to the Kneales,

It seems clear [especially in the Prior Analytics
with which the Kneales are primarily concerned at this
point] that the following four forms are regarded as
equivalent
A is predicated of B.
(1)
A belongs to B.
(2)
,

(

l

'

thing’

3

)

B is A.

In fact,

'

TCjoScy'ptc*'

translates, literally, as

,

6l

B is in A as in a whole.

(^)

"

5

The claim that Aristotle treats
certain

(y

sentences as interchangeable with other
kinds of sentences
seems to me to be further substantiated
by the De Sophistici-S

Elenchis

For in his discussion of the fallacy of

.

accidence, Aristotle does make use of at least
two other
ways of saying what he elsewhere expresses by

’

urrcyo^'e.t v»

For example, consider SE 179a28, where Aristotle
is

warning against the sophist’s principle (i).

There, in-

stead of speaking of "that which belongs to" the subject
(as he does earlier at l66b29-30), Aristotle uses the

expression 'to
the subject.

.

.

.

ackt£o v’ — "that which

is said of"

Thus

.

.

.

belongs to

.

.

.

is said of

and

seem to be interchangeable here.

And a little further on

from 179a28, after citing a number of examples of argu-

ments from accidence, Aristotle says
cpcxvepov

TO

KoOTcx

yap e.v orrvcxcri. fouroc^ ore oox
ToO 0-uy.p,e.prjKOTo^ Kcxl Kc<xk tou

oihrjQsoccrO c<c

c<vo<yKTj
-TTpoc

ypcx'Ca^

*

(It is clear in all these cases [i.e., in the counterexamples just mentioned] that it is not necessary that
the attribute be true of the accident and the subject.)

(179a36ff.

and M. Kneale
Clarendon Press,

5w.

(Oxford:

,

The Development of Logic
1962),

p

.
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Here, instead of

’

irrao^cv

'

,

Aristotle introduces the

verb ’»>i^0£o£<r5« c '__. to be true of
•

.

.

,

_

So

belongs to

is apparently also taken to be
interchangeable with
•

.

.

is true of

.

But, given that the expression ’belongs
to' is

interchangeable here with these other expressions,
are we
any closer to understanding what it means
to

say that some-

thing 'belongs to
sense?

1,

something else. In this Aristotelian

Since ’belongs to’ can be read as

’is true of',

one might suppose that the relation in question is
one
that might be mere intelligibly expressed as 'is an
attri-

bute of’.

This view is encouraged by translations that

explicitly insert that it is "attributes" that may properly
be said to "belong to” subjects and accidents.

An ad-

6

vantage of such an interpretation is that "belonging to"
turns out to be a somewhat familiar relation.

But here

a note of caution should also be expressed.

To hold that the relation expressed by 'belongs
to'

is the same as the relation expressed by

bute of’ is to restrict substitution on
'

.

.

.

belongs to

attributes.

’

'

.

’is an attri.

.

'

in

to expressions that designate

However, one should not think that this limits

the substituends for

’...’,

to abstract singular terms

^Among such translations are those of Forster,
Pickard-Cambridge and Poste.
,
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such as -whiteness',

-manhood-, etc;-

One should keep in

mind that Aristotle finds it
natural to say such things as
belongs to Socrates
and

ma n belongs to Coriscus.7
Of course, adjectives such as
’white' and substantives
such as ’man’ may seem like strange
attribute-designators.
But the point is that if we want
to read (as

shall)

I

'belongs to’ as 'is an attribute of', we
must, then, be

prepared to accept them as such.
With these few cursory remarks on 'subject'
and
'belongs to', let me turn now to a somewhat
fuller con-

sideration of the third key term in principles
)

—

'

crufxjzza

rj

ko^

T he Sense of

'

(

'

accident

oV

'

)

(i)

and

.

in De Sophist. lcis Elenchis:

Some Suggestions

Aristotle's sophist, as was pointed out in the previous section, makes use of both the principle
(i)

If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x if z belongs to y)

and the principle
(ii)

If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x, then
(z)(z belongs to x only if z belongs to y).

^G. E. L. Owen makes this point in "The Platonism of
Aristotle," Proceedings of the British Academy LI, (1965) p.
,

"If

say 'Socrates is old' or 'Socrates is a man',
what I predicate of Socrates on Aristotle's view is not old
age or manhood but simply old or man or, in English, a man
(The underlining merely indicates Owen's emphases.)
157:

I

—

.

In short, he is committed
to what was earlier
labelled
"(1)" (or "(1)
but what I shall from
")
hereon call "the
principle of accidence," or
simply "PA":
'

PA:

s

then
therWzXz

The question

b J ect
and y is an accident
^
belongs to x if and only if of x
z beings
>

want to consider in the
next two sections
is
What is meant by 'is an
accident of' here?" In this
section I shall consider some
possibilities that turn out,
for various reasons, to be
unsatisfactory. An attempt will
then be made in the following
section to provide an account
that I think comes closer to
the truth.
I

What sorts of things does Aristotle
include among
accidents of SE? It will become clear,
when we consider
his examples of arguments from
accidence, that Aristotle
wants to say such things as
(1)
C2;
(3)

Father is an accident of this dog.
Man is an accident of Socrates.
The one approaching is an accident
of Coriscus.

That is, among accidents of various
subjects (in the SE
sense of 'accident'), Aristotle counts
such diverse sorts

of entities as father, man, and the one
approaching.
an adequate account of the meaning of 'crujupzprj

K oj

So

8

must

at least be such that it allows sentences such
as (1) (3)

to be true.

As a first attempt at determining the appropriate
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sense of 'accident'

(or 'is an accident of') here,
it

seems reasonable to consider
what Aristotle says about
accidents in Topics
I say "it seems
reasonable" because
SE is traditionally regarded
as an appendix of Topics,.
One might suppose, in view of this,
that the sense of
.

'cru^.as^Ko/ specified in the latter treatise might
well
have been carried over into SE.
In the opening book of Topics

,

Aristotle sets out

to distinguish between four different
kinds of "predi-

cables'

definition, property, genus, and accident.

And

at 102b4 we are given two accounts of what
an accident

is

An accident is (1) something which though it
is none
,
of the foregoing i.e. neither a definition nor
a
property nor a genus yet belongs to the thing:
(2)
something which may possibly either belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing

—

—

....

Of these two accounts, Aristotle thinks the latter is the
better; for, with respect to the first, "one is bound, if
he is to understand it, to know already what definition and

genus and property are, whereas the second is sufficient of
9see, for example E. S. Forster's introduction to
his translation of De Sophisticis Elenchis
Both the Topics and the De Sophisticis Elenchis have
always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle.
The two treatises are closely connected; the De Sophisticis Elenchis is an appendix to the Topics and
its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises;
indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard the
two as forming a single work, since he twice quotes the
De Sophisticis Elenchis under the title of Topics
:

.
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Itself to tell us the essential
meaning of the term In
question "10
.

Perhaps the first thing that strikes
one on examining these two accounts of
’accident’ is that they are
not equivalent.
For, according to the first, an
accident
is something which "belongs
to" a given thing; but no such
condition is expressed in the second
account.
It is clear,

however, on further examination of
Topics that Aristotle
does intend this condition to be
understood." 11
What, then, according to the more
informative of
the two Topics accounts, is an accident?

It seems to me

that what is intended is at least something
like this:
(Al)

y is an accident of x iff (i)
(

11

y belongs to x,
and
o ~ (y b elongs
to x ) 12

)

,-

Thus, to use two of Aristotle’s favorite examples,
sitting
is an accident of a given individual--say
Socrates
,

— just

in case
(i)
(ii)

sitting belongs to Socrates, and
~ (sitting belongs to Socrates).

O

And white is an accident of e.g. Cleon provided that

^ Topics

102bl0-l4.
Both this quotation and the
previous one are from Pickard-Cambridge s translation.
'

11 See

,

especially, Topics 103bl8-19.

12 I use the symbol,
here, to stand for
Aristotle’s
(’it is possible (that)’).
For

'O’,

’

’

the moment, I shall leave this notion of "possibility"
unexplicated
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white belongs to Cleon, and
(white belongs to Cleon).
%>

~

Ui;

But does the Topics account of
i.e.

'

cru

(Al)— capture all the examples listed
earlier

accidents mentioned in SE?
(1)

of

It seems to me that although

Father is an accident of this dog

may pass the test, both
(2)

Man is an accident of Socrates

(3)

The one approaching is an accident of
Coriscus

and

raise problems.

But the problems raised by (3) are con-

siderably different from those raised by (2).

So I shall

defer consideration of the former for the moment.

Let us

first devote our attention to (2).

Man

or even being a man

— simply

does not seem to

be an appropriate candidate for an accident of Socrates.
It is true that Aristotle allows that man does,

way, "belong to" a particular man

— e.g.

in a certain

Coriscus. 13

So man

may be said to satisfy the first condition of the Topics
criterion.

But what about the second condition?

possible for man not to belong to Socrates?
be possible seems most un-Aristotelian.

Is it

That it should

Surely, as Aris-

totle views things, if there is anything that "belongs to"

Socrates that cannot cease to belong to him (at least, as
long as he exists), it is that!

Hence, one might conclude

13see Metaphysics 1015b28ff.
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that, in those passages where
Aristotle claims that man
Is an accident of a given
individual, he must surely have
in mind some criterion other
than (Al).l^
It is this example in

particular— i

.

e

.

(2)— that

has led commentators to suggest
somewhat "looser" accounts
of Aristotle's use of croppy
in SE.
Thus, for
example, C. L. Hamblin proposes that
Aristotle is here
'

using 'au|A 0 £^r,KO 5

"for any property of a thing that
is

'

not convertible with it. "15

Hamblin have in mind?

what

,

more precisely, does

In his words,

"'man’ is an accident

of 'Socrates’ because although Socrates
is a man not every
man is Socrates.

There seems to be a rather flagrant abuse of
the
use-mention'

distinction here.

seems to be that what

of what ’XcJK/oarrjy

Z lOK|Oo<Tl^ 5

»

'wQ

However, Hamblin’s point
'

designates is an accident

designates just in case

o<\>OpoJTTo<,

(Socrates (is a) man)
is true, but

(Man (is) Socrates)
li4

I do not mean to suggest that such a conclusion
would necessarily be correct.
Perhaps (Al) can be interpreted as I shall suggest, shortly in such a way that it
allows that man is an accident of a given individual.

—

Co.,

15 C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies
1970), p. 85.

—

(London:

Methuen and
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Is false.

That is to say, the expressions

jLcoxp »vT7j

'

^

'Sv^no;'

and

are not convertible.

This suggests the following
criterion of accidence:
(A2)

r

p is an accident of
is true, but (ii)

y

-1

c*

is

is true iff (i) ro< is p*
is false.

(A2) does seem to have the
advantage of including man among

the accidents of Socrates, while
retaining father, too, as
an accident of this dog.
Moreover, there is some textual
basis for the view that Aristotle links
the concept of

accidence (at least in one sense of
'accidence') with the
concept of non-convertibility. 1 ® However,
the difficulty
for this view arises from the fact that
in SE Aristotle

wants to say that the (one) approaching
an accident of Coriseus.
ing’ and

(

To itootnov)

is

But of course 'the one approach-

'Coriseus' seem to be convertible.

So, on (A2),

we cannot account for
(3)

The one approaching is an accident of Coriseus.

Another attempt to specify the sense of

'

crujj.pzprjKop

1

in SE is to be found in S. L. Peterson's The Masker Parad ox.

There Peterson says.
It should be observed that the sense of 'accident'
in 'fallacy of accident', as Aristotle's examples
show, and as the commentators agree, is just 'anything predicated' or 'anything that holds of something',
or maybe, 'anything that it falls to something to be. ^17

^ Topics
17 S.

L.

103b7ff.

Peterson, The Masker Paradox
Princeton, 1969), p. 76.

Ph.D. dissertation,

(unpublished
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Unfortunately, Peterson does not give'
us any help on how
we are to understand the expressions
'anything predicated',
'anything that holds of something'
and
'anything that it

falls to something to be'.

But on one possible reading,

these phrases might be taken to
suggest that we should
count as an accident of a given subject
designated
by

anything designated by any expression
,

truly predicated of

ex'.

/3

,

<*,

that can be

In other words, Peterson's cri-

terion might be formulated more precisely as
follows:
r

(A3)

is an accident of op
y6
is true.

is true iff

'

(A3) has a certain attraction.

all three of our examples from

approaching

is a

On this criterion,

SE— father,

man, and the one

turn out to be accidents of their respective

subjects.

However, in admitting these examples that we

want,

seems to open the way to a number of other

(A3)

examples that
to exclude.

I

am inclined to think Aristotle would want

In particular, I do not think

shall offer in the next section

— that

— for

reasons

I

Aristotle would want

to allow the SE sense of 'aruy.ps.prf ko^' to extend to the

following
(4)
(5)

Rational animal is an accident of man
Socrates is an accident of Socrates

Yet, on (A3),

(*0

and (5) seem to be true.

Thus, while (A3) appears to be a weak enough cri-

terion to include the relevant kinds of examples of accidents in SE, the objection that

I

shall try to make good
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on a little later is that it is
too weak.

Finally, before turning to my own
suggestion about
Aristotle's use of
crupp^Koj' In SE, I want to consider
one more rather interesting proposal
that Is suggested by
some remarks in a paper by Nicholas P.
White— "Origins
'

of Aristotle’s Essentialism. "18

At one point in his paper,

White reminds us of a thesis proposed by
Jaakko Hintikka
that

according to Aristotle, a statement is necessary
if

and only if it is true at all times. "19

I,

find this suggestion rather attractive.

And, as White

like White,

points out, one who is inclined to adopt it might well
conclude that Aristotle would be "unwilling to accept as true
any statement of the form 'Necessarily (A is F)’ where

'A'

designates a sensible particular which is perishable."
"For," as White continues, "he [i.e. Aristotle] suggests at
one place at least that, e.g., when Socrates is not in

existence, no affirmative statement about Socrates is true.
He might therefore be unwilling on this score to say that

Socrates is necessarily a man. "20

l^Nicholas P. White, "’Origins of Aristotle's
Essentialism," The Review of Metaphysics, (September,
1972), p. 62.
!9For Hintikka 's development of this thesis, see his
papers "Necessity, Universality, and Time in Aristotle,"
Ajatus XX (1957), pp. 65-90; "The Once and Future Sea
Fight," The Philosophical Review LXXIII, No. 4 (1964) pp
461—492
"Time, Truth, and Knowledge in Ancient Greek
Philosophy," American Philosophical Quarterly VI, No. 1
(1967) pp. 1-14
,

,

;

,

2C*White, op cit
.

.

,

p.

62.
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These remarks suggest a way
of understanding our
original criterion of accidence
from Topics
•

— i.e.

(Al)

in such a way as to accommodate
the view that man is an
accident of Socrates.

Consider
(A4)

/3

'is

(ii)

an accident of c* 1 is true at
tl iff
is true at t;i
73
and
/?
wr
n
(3t )( r
is
( cx
p ) is true at t).

~

>

Given that there is a time, tl,
such that ’This dog is a
father is true at tl, and a time
t2, such that
^ (This
dog is a father)’ is true at t2 (and
that would include any
time that the designatum of 'this
dog'
'

fails to exist), it

follows that ’Father is an accident of this
dog' is true at
tl.
And now, since 'Socrates is a man' was true
in

and yet there was a
is a man)'

time— e.g.

500

B.C.— when

'

~

M50

B.C.,

(Socrates

was true (again, any time that Socrates failed

to exist would do), we can say that

'man is an accident of

Socrates' was true in 450 B.C.
Yet another benefit of (A4) seems to be that the

one approaching turns out to be an accident of Coriscus
(at

certain times).

For if 'Coriscus is the one approaching'

was true at 2.00 p.m., and its negation is true whenever

Coriscus does not exist or is not approaching, then
(A4)

— 'The

— by

one approaching is an accident of Coriscus' was

true at 2.00 p.m.
Are there, then, any serious objections to (A4)?

Consider, again, the sentences

73
(4)

Rational animal is an accident of man

(5)

Socrates is an accident of Socrates

and

One of the weaknesses of (A3)— for
reasons as yet undis-

closed— was,

I

to be true.

A happy consequence of (A4), however,

suggested, that it allowed such sentences
is that

if we think of species (such as man) as being
imperish-

able

as Aristotle seems to do

(A4), not an accident of man.

— then

rational animal is, on

The reason is, of course,

that the second condition of the criterion is unfulfilled.
But over against this advantage with regard to
(4),
(A4) faces the same objection with respect to
(5) as did
(A3).

That is (A4)

dent of himself.

— like

(A3)

— admits

Socrates as an acci-

Consider the sentences

Socrates is Socrates.

(6)

Assuming that there is a time at which

(6)

first condition of (A4) is satisfied.

Is the second condi-

tion satisfied?

ceases to exist,

is true, the

Again, on the view that when Socrates

— in

White's words

— "no

affirmative state-

ment about him is true," there is a time when the negation
of (6) is true’ and, hence, the second condition
fied.

true

satis-

Thus, on (A4),

Socrates is an accident of Socrates

(5)

is true

is_

(at

least, as long as

'Socrates is Socrates' is

)

I

have thus considered four attempts to state the

74

truth conditions for the
application of
ln SE
N ° ne seems fc0 me
be entirely satisfactory.
me turn, therefore, to a
fifth and final proposal.

^

‘

—

Fi nal Suggestion About

'

X

rjKQ

Let

»

In attempting to understand
the use of

cru^eysrjKoj
in Aristotle's discussion of
the fallacy of accidence, one
»

wonders with what concept (or concepts)
Aristotle might be
contrasting it. The text, I think,
tells us.

At SS l69b3-7 Aristotle attempts
to explain how it
is that we come to be deceived
by arguments from accidence.

In arguments from accidence," he says,
"the deception

arises irom the inability to distinguish
between the same
and the different, the one and the many,
.

.

.

.

"

The sug-

gestion here is that, in an argument from accidence,
two
terms are treated as designating one and the same
thing,

when in fact they designate different things;
think Aristotle intends

— things

or— as

I

which are related only

accidentally.
We might take this passage, then, as a warning

against confusing the concepts of accidence and "sameness"
or

oneness".

In a later chapter, I shall try to develop

the contrast that

I

think Aristotle has in mind.

But, for

the moment, let me return to the problem of formulating a

criterion of accidence.
It may be evident, now, why I found both (A3) and
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(AH) unsatisfactory as
accounts of wbat Aristotle
intends
to include under the concept
of o^cySe^Ko; in SE. Earlier,
I

pointed out that on both (A3)
and

Socrates is an accident of Socrates

(5)

turns out to be true.

Now

I

(A 4)

But this, I suggested, is
unfortunate.

am in a position to explain
why
The reason why

I

I

think so.

think our criterion of accidence

should not allow sentences such as
(5) to be true is simply
that, as l69b3-7 indicates, Aristotle
wants to contrast

accidence with ’’sameness” (or "oneness”).

Hence, since

Aristotle surely wants to hold that
Socrates is the same as Socrates
is true,

he would presumably regard

Socrates is an accident of Socrates
as false 21
.

At this point, a word should also be said about
(4)

Rational animal is an accident of man

My reason for suggesting that our criterion should yield the

result that (4) is false is basically the same as that given
21 It is perhaps interesting
to note that, ih the
Topics discussion of accidence, Aristotle makes the point,
explicitly, that 'is an accident of' is irreflexive. Warning against the tactics of the sophist, Aristotle says,
"look and see also if he has stated a thing to be an accident of itself, taking it' to be a different thing because it
has a different name, as Prodicus used to divide pleasure
into joy and delight and good cheer:
for all these are names
of the same thing, to wit. Pleasure.
If then anyone says
that joyfulness is an [accident] of cheerfulness, he would be
declaring it to be an [accident] of itself." Topics 112b2126 (tr. Pickard-Cambridge )

76

in consideration of (5).

Assuming that ’rational animal'

correctly defines 'man', it follows,
on Aristotle's
account of definition in Topics that
,

Rational animal is the same as man
is true. 22
of’

But, if 30

,

then— given that

'is an accident

in SE is being contrasted with 'is
the same

as'— (4)

must be false on Aristotle’s view.
In view of these considerations, the
following

criterion of accidence seems to me to come closer
to what
Aristotle intends than those previously discussed:

r is an accident of

(A5)

/S>

(i)

(ii)

is true iff
is true and
1 * is the same as /p is not true.
1

c*”

rcy is

23

/

On (A5), examples (1) and (2) come out as they

should.

So do examples (4) and (5).

to pose a problem.
22 esp

However (3) may seem

It will be recalled that Aristotle

"
Topics 152b 39:
for if what is
signified by the term and by the expression be not the same,
clearly the expression rendered could not be a definition."
(tr. Pickard-Cambridge
.

.

.

.

2 3l

should emphasize that (A5) is simply an attempt
to elucidate the concept of accidence that is to be found^
in De Sophisticis Elenchis
Aristotle undoubtedly uses
(and
crofA/s s.fi,rjKo^
ve-c ) to mean different things
in different contexts.
(Compare, for example. Topics with
Metaphysics A30. ) So by no means do I wish to claim that
TX57ir an adequate criterion for distinguishing between
everything that Aristotle ever treats as an accident and
everything that he ever treats as a non-accident.
It should also be observed, here, that the use of
the metalinguistic variables,
c<
and
and,
in (A5)
/3
in fact, throughout this dissertation— is such that they are
taken to range over not only singular terms (as is the common
practice), but also over general terms such as '(a) man’ and
'(a) few (taken a) few times'.
.

'

>

'

'

'

’

'

'

,

—
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wants to say that 'the one
approaching' designates an
accident of Coriscus. There is
no difficulty with condition (i) of (A5).
(We assume that 'Coriscus
is the one
approaching- is true at a given
time.) But what about
condition (ii>? If 'The one
approaching is an accident of
Coriscus' is to be true, then-by
(A5)~'It is not the case
that the one approaching is the
same as Coriscus' must be
true.
.et how can 'Coriscus is the
one approaching'
and

It is not the case that the
one approaching is the same

as Coriscus’ both be true?
I

tion.

think Aristotle has an answer to this
last ques-

But since it is a fairly substantial
issue,

I

shall

delay discussion of it until a later
chapter. 24
So far, then,

what

I

I

have tried to give an account of

take to be Aristotle's characterization of
the

fallacy of accidence, and the use of

koj'

’

operative in his discussion of that fallacy.
(and final) section of this chapter

I

that is

In the next

want to return to the

indiscernibility and substitutivity interpretations of
Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle to show how both
of these are unsatisfactory, given that my version of the

fallacious principle of accidence is correct.
24 See Chapter IV.
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The Falla cious Principle of Accident

„n,i

In dlscernibility and Sub s
tltutivlty Interpref.al-.lnn*

Both the indiscernibillty interpretation
and the
substltutivlty interpretation of Aristotle's
solution to
the Corisous Puzzle identify the
principle that Aristotle
is out to reject as "Leibniz' Law,"
although each intends

something different by this last expression.
White seems to think that Aristotle wants
to give
up the principle

(x)(y)(if x
I

= y

then(F)(x has F iff y has F)).

have already criticized the reasons that White
offers in

defence of this claim.
a further point.

But now

I

am in a position to make

Assuming that my account (in the previous

sections) of the fallacious principle that Aristotle wants
to reject is correct, it is clear that Aristotle’s

abandonment of that principle by no means requires the

abandonment of White’s version of Leibniz’ Law.

For denial

of PA would require the denial of White’s LL only if this
latter principle implied PA

— which

of course it does not.

The principle

(x)(y)(if

x = y

then(F)(x has F iff y has F))

plainly does not imply
PA:

If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x iff z belongs to y),

since there is no reason to suppose that what holds for

"identicals" must hold also for "accidentals" (i.e. things
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related "accidentally ") —especially
in view of the fact
that the truth of
is accidental to oP requires
that

y

r<

* is the same as h" be not true. 2 5
1

The substitutivity interpretation,
on the other
hand, takes the position that the
principle that Aristotle
is concerned to reject is a principle
about the inter-

changeability of co-designative expressions

— e.g.

^

Prom
and 0 c?] we may infer (birp where
and r
5
are names and the formula <£>M is obtained
from the
formula Cp C5ZJ by replacing an occurrence of
£ by tj.
But here, again, the question arises as
to what such a

principle has to do with PA.

To make a point analogous

to that of the last paragraph, if my ccnstrual
of Aris-

totle’s use of

’

o-u^^)|Ko^

’

in SE is correct, then one

wonders what a principle about expressions of the form
•

•

form

•

'

has to do with one about expressions of the

is an accident of

'

’

.

In summary, it seems to me that the principle upon

which Aristotle thinks the various paradoxes of accidence
depend Is quite different from those candidates advocated
by the indiscernibility and the substitutivity interpreta2 5to

put the point in another way, if the indiscernibility of identicals (logically) implied PA, then the
former would be inconsistent with the denial of the latter;
i.e., the following sentences would be mutually inconsis-

tent

:

(x (y ) (if x = y then (F)(Fx iff Fy))
(3x)(3y)(x is an accident of y
~(F)(Fx iff Fy))
But, given my account of 'is an accident of', (i) and (ii)
are plainly consistent.

(i)

(ii)

)

.
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tions.

As

I

see it, Aristotle's rejection of
the fal-

lacious principle in question leaves both
White's and

Peterson's versions of Leibniz' Law untouched.

But it

still remains, of course, to show precisely
how my version
of the principle, PA, might have been
thought by Aristotle
to be applicable to each of the examples
mentioned in the

text

81

CHAPTER IV

.

the coriscus puzzle as a
paradox op accidence
Ar istotle's _Solu tlo n to
the Corlscus Pn^i^
Let us now return to the
Coriscus Puzzle.
owo,

I

In what

want to examine Aristotle's
remarks in SE 179a

the passage which is most
helpful to an understanding of his solution to
paradoxes of accidence in
general, and the Coriscus Puzzle
in particular.
Th e Coriscus Puz z le and the
Principle of

Earlier,

A

pointed out that in SE 179a26ff.
Aristotle makes
it clear that he thinks that
the Coriscus argument depends
on the fallacious principle of
accidence. To appreciate
Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle,
then, we must,
I

among other things, try to establish
precisely how that
principle might have been thought to
generate

that paradox.

The principle of accidence, it will be
recalled,
says that whatever attributes belong to
a given subject,

belong also to that subject's accidents and vice
versa.
Buo what, in the Coriscus Puzzle, are we to
count as at-

tributes, subject, and accident?

There seems to be general

agreement that both 'You know' and 'You do not know' designate, on Aristotle's view, attributes, or "entities" which

may be said to "belong to"
things

.

-

(

urrogp^acv)

,

certain other

Moreover, there is equally broad agreement that
1 Among

those who hold

this— either explicitly

Implicitly— are White, Peterson, Hamblin, and Poste.

or
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the subject must be Coriscus.
in question?

What, then, is the accident

It seems to me that we
have little choice

but to say that it is whatever
is designated by 'the one
approaching' ('to rrpoa^v )
And, as puzzling as this
may seem, at least at first
glance, it does open up a way
of showing how the principle
of accidence-PA-mlght have
been thought to underlie the
Coriscus Puzzle.
'

.

Consider the Coriscus argument again:
(1)
(2)
.

..to;

You know Coriscus.
You do not know the one approaching.
Coriscus is the one aporoaching.
You do not know Coriscus.
ou now Coriscus and you do not know
l
Coriscus.
^
You know
and you do not know the same thing.

The step of particular interest is from
lines (2) and (3)
to (4).
If we take line (3) to tell us that the
one

approaching is an accident of Coriscus, then, since

(2)

tells us that the one approaching has the
attribute designated by ’You do not know’, PA allows us to
infer (4)

—

i.e.

that Coriscus has the same attribute.

More, of course, needs to be said about some of

these suggestions.

But, for the moment, let us assume

that this is, in fact, how Aristotle conceives of the role

of PA in the generation of the Coriscus Puzzle, and go on
to consider what he actually has to say about that prin-

ciple

.

Aristotle

'

s

Rejection of the Principle of Accidence

At SE 179a26ff. Aristotle straightforwardly denies that

whatever attributes belong to an accident of a given sub-

.

83

ject belong also to that subject:
l! Ce ib is undetermined
whether that which is
?
id ^
belongs to the subject whenever it
belongs to
*e accident, and since
in some cases it is thought
and Said t0:> but in othe ^s this
is said to be "not
nop
necessary,
we
.

ought, therefore, in all cases alike
when a conclusion has been reached,
sayy that it 1S
is'
not necessary.

In support of this denial, Aristotle
first pro-

duces several counter-examples.

Although each of these is

simply identified by mention of a key
phrase, it is clear
that Aristotle is referring us to well-known
arguments that
he presumably thinks depend upon PA, yet
which have true

premisses and a false conclusion.

The Coriscus argument

is, of course, one of these.

All such arguments as those following commit the
fallacy of accidence.
'Do you know what I am about to
ask you?'
Do you know the one approaching or the
masked one?'
’Is the statue your work?’ or ’Is the dog
your father?’
’Are the few, taken a few times, a few? ’2
*

,

The presentation of counter-examples to PA is, of

course, sufficient to demonstrate the falsity of that

principle.

3

But Aristotle is not content to leave the

matter there.

He adds the following remarks:

It is clear in all these cases [i.e.

in the counter-

^The emphasis is mine.

3Peter son, however, claims that the production of
these particular examples would not have convinced the
sophist of the falsity of his principle.
(S. L. Peterson,
The Masker Paradox (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton, 1969), 117 ff.)
Yet assuming that the sophist agrees
that his principle is the one that justifies these inferences, it is not clear what more convincing counter-examples
could be produced, since, e.g., the Coriscus Puzzle, has
true premisses and a conclusion that is, in fact, selfcontradictory
.
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examples just mentioned] that it is
not necessary that
tribute b s true of the accident anS ?he subjecf
USht t at t0 ° nly those thin
ss Which are
without difference
diff°
?
in substance and are one do all t-hp
same [attributes] belong.
But with respect to the good
h*
a
b
the S° od and to be something
f-,
aboit ?fb
about
S rr\°
to be asked
[about];
nor is it the same for the
one approaching or the masked one
to be, and for
Coriscus to be.
So that, as a result, it is not
the
case that if I know Coriscus, but do
not know the one
approaching, that I know and do not know the
same
thing 4
.

These lines are of considerable interest;
so let us examine
them more closely.
The first sentence simply reminds us that
sophisms

such as the Coriscus Puzzle are clear cases in
which we do
not want to allow that subject and accident have
all their

attributes in common.
begins to give what

But, in the next sentence, Aristotle

shall characterize as an "explanation"

I

of why subjects and accidents such as Coriscus and the one
It should be observed that the phrase
p.ovo^
-v rjv o<J CT(_°<y
£v oucrtv
which is
translated here as ’to only those things which are without
difference in substance and are one’ might be translated
alternatively, as ’to only those things which, according to
substance, are without difference and are one’
The
difference, of course, lies in the fact that whereas in the
former, ’k«tcx ctj v> oucr C o< v
in substance
___
is taken to
(
modify simply
o< qjo/oa
(without difference), in the
latter it is taken to modify cxS^acpopo^s
:cpopo<- 5 xo<(.' £.v
(’with„

TOC5

^

^

Ko<'Co<

.

.

.

.

—

—

’

y

’

’

’

’

’

out difference and
one’).
As far as I have been able to determine, there is
no decisive consideration in favor of either reading.
Peterson has offered some reason for supposing that the
former is to be preferred ( The Masker Paradox pp. 131-135)
but the considerations she mentions are not entirely convincing.
Nevertheless, since as far as my interpretation
is concerned
nothing of substance seems to turn on the
choice, I have elected to go along with Peterson's suggestion.
.

—

.

.

—
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approaching should be expected
to differ with respect
to
some of their attribut es 5
.

The first line of the
explanation is the general
statement
to

'
'

p

°J

.

lly those things which
are without
h
differ
dlffer are °" e d0
:aL

^e

UtlAUf.nTonT

As noted earlier, it seems
plausible to rewrite this as
the conditional
(E1)
t heF

fan!

a

their attributes
^.
^mgs which are

in common,
without

diffelenr^
dil
Terence T
in suostance and are one.
Next

,

Aristotle remarks on two of the
counter-

examples that he has just mentioned.

He says

But with respect to the good,
it is not the same to
be .he good and to be something
about to be askednor is it the same for the one
approachLg (ofth4
masked one) to be and for Coriscus to
be

Each of these claims seems intended
to be a denial of the
consequent of an instance of (El). That
is, Aristotle’s

assertion of
(E2)'

It is not the same to be the good and
to be

something about to be asked

seems intended to be the denial of the consequent
of
the good and what is about to be asked have
all their attributes in common, then the good

^My notion of "explanation" may appear to bear some
resemblance to Peterson's notion of "diagnosis." However
her suggestion that Aristotle, in the few lines in question,
is out to diagnose "motives of error" attributes to
Aristotle an interest in certain psychological matters that my
notion of "explanation" does not.
(see The Masker Paradox,
pp. 106-131).
.

—

86

and what is about to be
asked are things which are
without difference in substanc
e

and are one;

and his assertion.
(E2)

Nor is it the same for the
one approaching
to be
and for Coriscus to be.

'

.

.

.

seems intended to be the
denial of the consequent of
(El)

»

T

If the one approaching and
Coriscus have all
their attributes in common, then
the one
approaching and Coriscus are things
wh?ch are
without difference in substance and
are one.

If this last point is granted,
then it should be

clear how Aristotle might be thought
to be providing us with
an explanation of why subjects and
accidents do not share
all their attributes.

For, from (El)' and (E2)», we can

derive
(E3)

The good and what is about to be asked do
not
have all their attributes in common;

and from (El)" and (E2)" we can derive
(E3)

The one approaching and Coriscus do not have
all
their attributes in common.
In general, then, if asked why, from the fact that

a subject a has a certain attribute, F-ness, we cannot

infer that b--an accident of a

reply is simply this.

— also

has F-ness, Aristotle's

The inference cannot be drawn be-

cause, if a and b had all their attributes in common, then

they would be without difference in substance and one; but
a and b are not without difference in substance and one.
It seems to me,

then, that in his discussion of the

solution to paradoxes of accidence, Aristotle not only

identifies and rejects the principle of accidence, but he

87

also tries to explain why we
should

riot

expect subjects

and their accidents to have all
of their attributes
in common.
_

Yet this explanation, in turn,
draws attention

to another important and interesting
feature of Aristotle's

solution

The-No^lde.ntit y of Coriscus and The One
Approaching
In the preceding paragraphs,

I

suggested that it seems

reasonable to assume that Aristotle takes
the being of a is not the same as the being
of

b

to be a way of denying
a and b are things which are without
difference in

substance and are one.

This requires that we regard this last statement
as im-

plying
the being of a is the same as the bding of b.

However, it seems equally reasonable to suppose that the

implication goes both ways.

In that case, the two state-

ments in question can be treated as equivalent.

Thus,

instead of saying

... to only those things which are without difference in substance and are one do all the same
[attributes] belong,
Aristotle might have put it this way:
to only those things whose being (to
is the same do all the same [attributes] belong.
.

.

.

)

That Aristotle would, in fact, have found the latter ac-

ceptable is confirmed by Physics 202bl il-l6:

.

88

OU
<5tX

Y&f) T'cXuVot, rr 4 v'Co<

** ^ovov

0I5

To

c

e?v<*<.

Vo

T0T5

cxiro

*

OTT COC^oO V

t-o ^5 o^UTo'C},

6

But what is the point of insisting
that If a and b
share all their attributes, a and
b must be not merely
one, but also "without difference
in substance?" Does it
not follow from the fact that a and
b are one, that a and

without difference in substance?

—

One might be inclined to answer this
last question
affirmatively, provided that ’a and b are
one
is taken to
’

mean

f

a and b are the same’.

But, even allowing this,

Aristotle wants to answer "No."

That is, Aristotle seems

to want to allow that some things are
appropriately called

one," or "the same," even though they are different
in

substance (outru) or being (to otv^c.

).

For example, he wants to say that the road from

Thebes to Athens is the same as the road from Athens to
Thebes, but the being (to

ec.v'oce

same as the being of the other.

7

)

of the one is not the

Furthermore, he thinks

that although the distance from A to B may be the same as
the distance from B to A, the being (to £cv<*0 of each is
o

not the same.

And the process of Socrates’ teaching Plato

6"For it is not the case that all the same [attributes] belong to things which are the same in any way
whatever, but only to those whose being is the same."
^ Physics
^

202bl3-l4.

Physics 202b20-22
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is held to be the
same as the process of
Plato's learning

from Socrates, but not
"properly" <k U(0
because their ’’being” is not
the sane.

,'«

5

)

the same-again,

9

Thus, on Aristotle's view,
something, a, may be one
and the same as something,
b, without being
"properly” so.
But the view that things
may be the "same,” but not

"properly” so, raises the possibility
that 'same' may not
always be understood as
=
And this leads me to what
I take to be an interesting
and significant feature of
Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus
Puzzle.
*

I

•

.

take it that Aristotle's point in
insisting that

"to only those things which are
without difference in snb-

itance do all the same attributes belong" is
to warn
against the mistaken assumption that things
which are one
and the same in any old way— even
"improperly"— may have all
their attributes in common.

Aristotle thinks the class of

indiscernibles is much narrower.

Indiscernibles must also

be "without difference in substance."

And it seems plausi-

ble to take this to mean that indiscernibles
must be

Identical (where 'identical' is used in such a way that

'x

is identical to y' may be formalized as the
well-defined
?

x = y

'

)

How, then, does this point bear on the Coriscus

Puzzle?

When Aristotle tells us that the being of Coriscus

is not the same as the being of the one approaching, I take

9Physics 202b20-22
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him to be denying that
Coriscus and the one approaching
are identical.
In other words, I think
he would simply
deny the appropriateness
of

Coriscus

-

the one approaching

as a representation of

Coriscus is the one approaching.
Here my interpretation of
Aristotle’s solution to
the Coriscus Puzzle diverges
significantly from those of
White and Peterson. On each of
the latter interpretations,
the assumption that Coriscus
is identical with the one

approaching is left unquestioned.

In fact, in each of

these cases, that assumption is
crucial to the interpretation.
Both think that Aristotle is out to
reject a
principle that licenses the inference from

^Km
c

=

m

to

~Kc

White takes the principle to be the indiscernibility
of

identicals.

He has Aristotle replacing that principle

with a "revised version" of the indiscernibility of
identicals.

Peterson, on the other hand, thinks that the

principle being questioned is a substitution principle.
And she has Aristotle (like Carnap) putting a restriction
on that principle to cover cases involving opaque
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contexts. 10
In contrast to these
suggestions, however, my own
view is that Aristotle's
solution to the Coriscus
Puzzle

involves two major steps.

First, he attempts to clarify

the "logical form" of the
premiss
(

3

Coriscus is the one approaching.

)

We should not be misled
into thinking of (3) as
(3)

i3CUS and the ° ne ^^ching
are
without
withou^°dif?°r
1
difference in
substance and are one')

'

Rather, we should recognize that
what (3) tells us is perhaps more explicitly rendered by
(

3

)"

The one approaching is an accident
of Coriscus.

The next move, then, is to point
out that, although

there is a valid principle that licenses
the inference
from
a has the attribute F-ness

and
a = b

to
b_

has the attribute F-ness,

the principle required to licence the inference
from
a has the attribute F-ness

and
10 For a comparison
of Peterson’s interpretation of
Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle with Carnap’s
solution to "belief context paradoxes," see Peterson's
The Masker Paradox Section 21.
.
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b

is an accident of a

(or

-a is

an accident of b

'

to
b has

— i.e.

the attribute F-ness

the principle of accidence—
is plainly invalid.

Accidence and Samene ss

as

the_Same.’'

"Accid entals

The view that

Coriscus is the one approaching
should not be understood as

Coriscus

=

the one approaching

may seem to some to be rather
implausible.
But it seems to
me that this is Aristotle's
position.
So let me try to

develop it.
In Metaghyslcs V, 9, Aristotle
says that

('same') is used in various ways.

strictest"

— is

the

<*o'c 6

"

One such

use.

'tcxuToV

use— the

Another— and this

the one that seems to me to be of
particular interest
is the

" Xc<xtx

ko v

"

is

here—

use.

At Metaph ysics 10l8a5ff.

,

Aristotle links the notion

of -tdodv k*6>’*6c 6 with that of "being
one In substance."

Thus, it seems not unreasonable to suppose
that he treats
a is the same in itself (kckQ

3

o(<jTo

)

as b

as an alternative for
a and b are without difference in substance,
and are

one
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But, since Aristotle clearly
denies that Coriscus and the
one approaching are "without
difference in substance, and
one," we must conclude that he would
deny the truth of

Coriscus is the same in himself (-cai-cov
as the one approaching

i<«0>

*6x6

)

Yet the possibility remains that
Aristotle would allow

that Coriscus and the one approaching
are nevertheless the
same accidentally (t^utov
And, in fact,
.

there are at least two points that appear
to support the

contention that this

is_

what Aristotle would want to say.

First, at Metaphysics 1017bl7-l8, Aristotle allows
that the pale one (to
as the musical one

(to

^jkov)

is accidentally the same

^ouctckov), provided, presumably,

that the pale one is the musical one.

Then, at Meta -

physics 1015bl7, he allows that Coriscus is accidentally
the same as the musical one (t~o j^o vcr

koJ)

,

again, assuming,

presumably, that Coriscus is the musical one.
me that if Aristotle thinks of the use of
o-u^jieprjKof'

latter

— it

It seems to

'Wurov

as appropriate in these cases--expecially the

is reasonable to suppose that he would allow

that

Coriscus is accidentally the same as the one
approaching
is also appropriate

(given that Coriscus is the one

approaching)
Second, at Metaphysics 1017b30-l, we find the
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following claim:
*

h

*

r

^

?

the other?

^

musical one [is accidentally
the sane aO
insofar as the on e is an accident

of

This suggests the principle

accident of
is true, then
dentally the same as 1 /is true.
p
1

T*

is acci-

Thus, one might reason, since
'the one approaching is an
accident of Coriscus', is true ’the
one approaching is

accidentally the same as Coriscus’ is
true too.
I

1!

shall assume, therefore, that although
Aris-

totle would deny the truth of

Coriscus is the same in himself
one approaching.
i

.

e

.

(

k«Q>

)

as the

,

Coriscus and the one approaching are without
difference in substance, and are one,
i

.

e

.

,

Coriscus

-

the one approaching,

he would allow that

Coriscus is accidentally
as the one approaching,
is true.

(xo<t.c<

ssv] koj)

11

the sam°

But how are we to understand this distinction?
A First Approach to the Analysis of Accidental

oameness

.

One approach to the analysis of expressions of

the form
a is accidentally the same as the P
11 This, of course, requires the assumption that the
notion of ''accidence" in this passage of the Metaphysics
is the same as that found in De Sophisticis Elenchis
.
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is

outlined— however sketchily— in
Nicholas

P.

White’s

"Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness,”
and "Origins of
Aristotle's Essentialism. "12
Briefly, White suggests that, in
his discussions
of accidental saneness and
oneness, Aristotle treats
expressions such as
tA
and
'

’

To

as

singular terms which designate entities
distinct from
primary substances. That is, even
if 'Coriscus

is the

musical one' is true,

'Coriscus' and 'the musical one'

here designate different things.

But, despite their

diversity, these two things are nevertheless
"accidentally the same." Their accidental sameness
consists in
their being, in some way , intimately related:
To say that "the man" and "the musical"
are
accidentally the same" seems to be to treat them
as
in some wav distinct things which are somehow
linked
together. li
.

This suggestion, of course, needs to be filled out.
One wants to know something about the nature of entities
12 White, "Aristotle on
Sameness and Oneness,"
The Philosophical Review LXXX, No. 2 (1971), esp. op.
lob-187
"Origins of Aristotle's Essentialism," The^ Review
of Metaphysics XXVI (September 1972), esp. pp. 7T-72
,

;

.

,

13 White,

"Origins of Aristotle's Essentialism."
Incidentally, the fact that White claims
that, e.g. 'Coriscus' and 'the musical' designate distinct
entities, even if Coriscus is the musical (one), is difficult to reconcile with his view that the crucial inference
in the Coriscus Puzzle depends on the indiscernibility of
identicals.
For., as indicated earlier, this latter point
requires that 'Coriscus is the (one) approaching' be understood as 'Coriscus = the (one) approaching'.
p.

72,

fn.

30.
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such as the musical one,
the pale one, etc.
One wants
also to know more about the
relation of "being somehow

linked together."

Unfortunately, however, White-at
least

in the papers just
mentioned-says little about either
of
these matters.
Yet he does try to offer some
support for
the claim that Aristotle did
in fact think that expressions
such as 'To |ioocru<ov
('the musical one'),
T± AtUKoV
1

<

('the pale one'), etc., do designate
entities which are

neither primary substances nor
members of any category
other than substance.
For instance, in "Origins of
Aristotle's Essentialism," White says
It has been suggested thus far
that it is
stance at tributes whose loss, so to speak, onlv subentails the
the sensible Particular which had them.
Ther. are, °ihowever, a number of passages
which seem to
indicate that according to Aristotle, even the
loss of
a non-substance attribute takes
something out of exisexam ple if Socrates ceases to be musical,
xS sometimes willing to say that
something
called ’the musical (thing)” ( rd uoocn,<^)
perishes
or ceases to exist.
Similarly too, he sometimes talks
Soc ^ates comes to be musical, we can say
s,™ hen
thati, the musical' comes into existence
vCvvzx *</).
Examples of this way of talking can be found, e.g.,
at
Phys. l88b4-8
190al-3, 16-21.
He also sometimes allows
such talk in connection with an expression like "the
musical man”:
the perishing of the musical man takes
place when the man ceases to be musical (An. Pr. 47b33hy
b ^' 190a13
20 ' 21 ’ 195b18 - 21 ’ 22 5a3-5,
12-20 63-65)
,

(

,

,

’

^

White , "Origins of Aristotle's Essentialism,
For White's claim that expressions such as
-co
^ouo-cxov' (at least in the contexts under consideration)
do not designate attributes, see p. 72.
p.

7 -l.

'
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But one might be inclined to
object that White has

been too hasty here.

Plainly there are passages in which

Aristotle "talks as if" there are things
such as the musical
one, the pale one, etc.
Yet should we conclude
from this

that Aristotle would allow that, in
fact, expressions such
as
the musical one*, ’the pale one*, etc.,
designate non'

substantial entities of some sort?
Surely one may "talk as if" there are such
things
as the musical one, the pale one, and
(to choose a recent

example that should help to make the point) the
present
King of France, while holding that expressions such
as
the musical one’,

'the pale one' and

'the present King of

France', fail to designate (or denote) any individual at
all.

Such, of course, was Russell's position.

point is simply that

expressions

,

And the

while acknowledging that certain

may appear to be singular terms, they are in

fact not, since they can be paraphrased away.

^-5

Interestingly enough, White entertains the possibility that Aristotle might have regarded expressions of
the form 'the F' as eliminable by paraphrase.

Yet his con-

clusion is that, although this possibility may be somewhat "inviting," it is not supported by the evidence.

Aristotle's way of treating an expression such as 'the
1 5see,

for example, Bertrand Russell's "On
Denoting," Mind, Hi, (1905).
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musical one- is "not to
paraphrase It away, and he
nowhere
makes an aoross-the board
attempt to do so. "16
X
I

f^nd this last point
persuasive.

Furthermore,

think that

especially with the paraphrase
possibility
ruled out— passages such as
those that White refers to
(In the above quotation)
do present a fairly strong
case
in favor of the view that
Aristotle takes expressions
such as ’-ci ftou o-twiv' etc.
(in the contexts under consideration) to designate entities
other than substances.
Other passages, too, might be
taken to support the view
For instance, in his commentary
on Metaphysics 1015b23,
Christopher Kirwan states that

^

artlstlc l>°
and Coriscus
are nniT"^
CaUSe ° ne coincides in the other";
these
items, then, are regarded by Aristotle
as different
h
r la l0n hip
S
f coincid iag combines
tnem into
then
iAto a kind
H of
r unity. 17
7

^

r^

-

i

But, supposing now that such a view
is, in fact, Aris-

totle’s, how does this help in the project
at hand— i.e.

understanding the distinction between
Coriscus

-

the one approaching

and

ing?

SCUS iS accidentally the same as the one
approach-

1

White, "Origins of Aristotle’s Essentialism,"
^ Aristotle’s

,
by Christopher
Kirwan
P. 134.
,

Metaphysics translated with notes
(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971),
,
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is clear that,

if Aristotle holds that

'Coriscus'
the one approaching'
designate different entities,
then he cannot (consistently)
hold that

and

'

Coriscus

=

the one approaching

But if

the one approaching’ does
not designate

Coriscus (even if Coriscus is
the one approaching), then
what does it designate?
And why should Aristotle
think
that whatever it designates
is, nevertheless, "accidentally
the same as" Coriscus?
In a Provocative footnote to
"Origins of Aris-

totle’s Essentialism,

"

White remarks that "It begins to

^

look a little as if the objects
which Aristotle has in mind
[i.e. the designata of
K oV, etc.] are like what
Carnap called ’individual concepts'
."18
White, however does not pursue this.
Yet, since I too
.

.

find this sug-

gestion tempting, let me try to push It
a little further.
To understand Carnap's notion of
an "individual

concept" we must have recourse to his
distinction between
"extensions" and "intensions" of individual
expressions.

Carnap states that distinction as follows:
The extension of an individual expression is
the individual to which it refers.
The Intension of an individual expression
is the individual concept expressed by it. 19
1

Nicholas P. White, "Origins of Aristotle's
Essentialism," p. 7 6, fn. 40.

^Rudolph Carnap, Meaning and Necessity
University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 40-41.

(Chicago:
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illustrate (by way of Carnap's
own example), each of
the individual expressions,
'Walter Scott' and 'the author
of Waverley', has both an
extension and an intension. The
6nSl0n of each is " the individual
to which it refers"-i.e. Walter Scott, i.e.
the author of Waverley.

—

-

But the

I ntension

of 'Walter Scott' is the
individual concept

Walter Scott,

(and not the individual concept
The Author of

Waverley); and the in tens ion of
'the author of Waverley' Is
the individual concept The Author
of Waverley (and not the

individual concept Walter Scott).

Thus, according to

^arnap, although the individual
expressions 'Walter Scott'
and 'the author of Waverley' have the
same extension
,

their intensions are different.
Of course,

I

do not wish to claim that Aristotle

anticipated something like Carnap's distinction
between
extension and intension. All that is being suggested

is

that Aristotle seems to treat individual
expressions as
if they designate, even in "transparent” contexts, entities

like Carnap's individual concepts.

And, clearly, one

advantage of such a view is that we do, in that case, have
a way of understanding why Aristotle might have taken

Coriscus
to be false.

=

the one approaching

For this sentence would express something

20 For a discussion of the notion of
referential
"transparency," see W. V. 0. Quine, Word and Object
(.Cambridge:
M. I. T. Press, i 960). Section 30 (esp. p. 144).
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like the proposition that the
individual concept Coriscus
is identical with the
individual concept The One

Approaching, which is simply not
true. 21
But if Aristotle's view about
the designata of

individual expressions is as suggested,
then what would
have to be the case in order for
a sentence
r

tx

~

fS

n

to be true?

In other words, what should we
expect the

identity conditions for these
"individual-concept-like"
entities to be?

Clearly it is not sufficient to require

simply that
is y3">

2

course, although I have expressed symDathy for
suggestion about Aristotle's view of the designata
ex P r ssions
1 am not unaware of the fact that
J
that suggestion raises
a number of serious difficulties.
For example, if it is allow ed that in any context,
an expression such as 'the one approaching*
designates an
GOnce Ptj how are We to understand sentences such
as
The^ one approaching is taller than Socrates’
or 'Xanthippe kissed^ the one approaching*.
Surely no one can kiss
the individual concept The One Approaching; nor is
it possible for that concept (or, for that matter, any concept)
to
be taller than something else.
Yet don't the sentences
just mentioned, where 'the one approaching' is taken to
designate an individual concept, in fact imply such
absurdities?
Then there is the question of the identity conditions of these Aristotelian entities.
Carnap tells us that
the identity or non-identity of individual concepts "can be
determined on the basis of
semantical rules
and Necessity p. 4l).
( Meaning
But it is not clear just
how Aristotle proposes to deal with this issue.
He seems
to want to deny that Coriscus is identical with the one
approaching.
But would he allow that there are any true
identity statements of the form
y,

White

.

s

>

r

It

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

= pP

where c< ^ p ? If so, which are they?
Coriscus = the one approaching?

And why those but not
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be true.

For, after all, although
Aristotle

view, at least

Coriscus

=

— want

does— on my

to deny that

the one approaching

Is true, he Just as
clearly does not want to
deny the

truth of

Coriscus is the one approaching,
should, then, if Aristotle's
view is as suggested,
expect to find him laying down
a stricter condition.
But
Isn't that exactly what he
does?
It will be recalled that
Aristotle's reason for

denying that Coriscus and the one
approaching have all their
attributes in common is that "[it is
not] the same for the

one approaching to be
>SE 179b 3— 4

)

...

,

and for Coriscus to be."

This suggests that a necessary
condition for

the truth of
r

and

y3

are indiscernible

to be

o<

is the same as to be

o<

-1

is that
r

be true.
r

<*

It is not enough that simply
is jQ

be true.
**

n
js,

n

But, if

and

j3

are indiscernible

-1

is true if and only if

ro<
is true

=

/P

(and I assume that Aristotle does hold this), then

the truth of

103
r

to be

o<

is the same as to be

must be a necessary condition
for the truth of
r

o<

=

It seems to me, then,

that even Aristotle's re-

marks on the fallacy of accidence
itself— specifically
SE 179a38ff.— can be thought
of as lending further support
to the view that Aristotle regards
the designata of individual expressions as being something
like Carnap's individual concepts. And since, on this
view, it is clear why
Aristotle would not want to allow that

Coriscus

= the one

approaching

Is true, let us turn now to the question
of why he might,

nevertheless, have wanted to say that
Coriscus is accidentally the same as the one
ap^
proaching
is true.

The answer to this last question is,

simply this.

I

suspect,

Coriscus may be correctly said to be "acci-

dentally the same as" the one approaching in virtue of the
fact thao, although to be Coriscus is not the same as to be
the one approaching, Coriscus, nevertheless,

approaching.
r

c<

And in general, a sentence

is accidentally the same as

is true just in case
(i)

r

©<

is

n Is true, but

/3

~^

3

j

is_

the one

10-4

r
to be

(ii)

iS the same as to be

04

Of course,

jP

is not true .2 2

have not tried to say
what might be
meant by statements of
the form
To be

o<

I

is the same as to be a

1

Does Aristotle mean
something like
^The essence of * is the
same as the essence of
But what does this mean?

Or perhaps what is
intended is

something like

Necessarily,

o<

is
/

Yet, again, what sort of
"necessity" is

physical, or something else?

this— logical

Might Hintikka’s suggestion

about a connection between "time
and necessity" in Aristotle’s thinking be helpful here? 2 3
These seem to me to be interesting
and important
questions.
But they go far beyond the limited
goal that
22l

V

I

W ° rth notin S th *t this statement
of the
conditions for the truth of sentences of the form rc* is accidentally
tence^of
the same as
bears
resemblance to my earlier statement (in Chapter
TTTWr he neces sary and sufficient
conditions for the
;
Zu
sentences of the form ^ is an accident of c*
In fact, given that c* is the same
as j3 n is equivalent to
to be * is the same as to be /P
the truth-conditions
,
r S
en eS ° f b0th of the above forms will be
the same.
mK
f^ ?is appropriate is perhaps
confirmed to some extent by Aristotle’s remark at Metaphysics
1017b26ff. that
man and musical are [accidentally] the same because
one is an accident of the other; and the musical
one [is
accidentaily the same as] (a) man because it is an accident
oi the man
S

V

-1

.

4-

.

.

.

.

2 3Recall

my Chapter III, fn.

19.
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have

set— viz.

that of establishing some
plausibility for

the claim that although Aristotle
would allow that Coriscus
may be the one approaching, and
may even be said to be

accidentally the same as" the one
approaching, it is false
that Coriscus is identical with
the one approaching.
Some Advant ages of the Present
Interpretation

.

Finally, let me draw attention to
several additional points
In support of the view that I have
been defending.
First, if it is correct that Aristotle
denies that

Coriscus and the one approaching are identical,
then, on
his view, the principle required to
license the inference

from, e.g..

You do not know the one approaching
and

Coriscus is the one approaching
to

You do not know Coriscus,

would be logically independent of the principle of the

indiscernibility of Identicals.

Consequently

,

Aristotle’s

rejection of the former would not require his rejection of
the latter

.

Thus, there is no reason to suppose— as some

(e.g. White and Peterson) have argued

— that

in solving the

paradoxes of accidence, Aristotle is forced to deny the

indiscernibility of identicals

—a

principle which, earlier,
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at T opics 152b25-29, he
clearly affirms.

2 *1

Second, given that Aristotle
takes the designate
of the individual expressions,
'Coriscus' and 'the one
approaching', to be distinct
"individual-concept-like"
entities, there is no need to
try to develop more complicated reconstructions of the
Coriscus Puzzle such as that
proposed by Peterson.

Peterson formulates Aristotle’s
argument in such
a way as oo suggest that the
difficulty inherent
in it

turns on the logical peculiarities
of opaque propositional
knowledge contexts. Of course, as
pointed out earlier,
such a formulation strays from literal
representation of
the Greek.
But Peterson feels compelled to make
this move
because on the literal representation, we
should have to

allow that both
You know Coriscus (i.e. Coriscus has the
attribute
of being known by you)
and
You do not know the one approaching (i.e. the
one
approaching has the attribute of being not known by

you)

are true; and yet, in her opinion, since Coriscus is

identical with the one approaching, this cannot be the
case
Yet, if
P ll m

— as

I

have recommended

— we

simply give up

This point has already been touched upon in
Chapter III.
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the assumption that

'Coriscus’ and ’the one approaching’

designate the same entity, then there is
no need to
abandon the literal version of the argument.

Of two

distinct entities, it is possible that one
should have the
attribute of being known by you while the
other has the

attribute of being not known by you.

Third--and last

— it

will be recalled that one of

the criticisms levelled against Peterson's
substitut ivity

interpretation was that it leaves Aristotle with a plainly
implausible view.

That view is that

expressions substitutable in knowledge contexts
must also be substitutable in
is not different in
respect of substance from
and 'to be
is to be
.

.

.

’

*

’

And 'knowledge contexts', here, includes contexts such as
You do not know that
market-place

...

is the darkest one in the

But, as pointed out earlier, we can validly infer

You do not know that the one approaching is the darkest
one in the market-place

from
You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one in
the market place

given simply
You know that Coriscus is the one approaching
It is by no means necessary that Coriscus be "not different

in respect of substance from the one approaching."

25see Chapter

I.

Now,
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however, it seems only fair
to consider whether
Aristotl e
comes out any better, with
respect to this issue on
my
j

interpretation.
On the account that

I

have offered, Aristotle re

Jects the assumption that
Cor_Lscus is the one approaching

means the same as
Coriscus

=

the one approaching

He then argues that, in
that case, there is no necessity
to
accept the inference.

You do not know the one approaching
Coriscus is the one approaching
.'.You do not know Coriscus.

And all that is claimed here, is
that from the information
that the one approaching has the
attribute of being not

known by you, and that Coriscus is
the one approaching, it
does not follow that Coriscus has the
attribute of being
not known by you— the reason being that
although Coriscus
is the one approaching, it is not the
case that Coriscus

and the one approaching are "without difference
in sub-

stance."

In other words, it is not the case that

’Coriscus = the one approaching’ is true.

And hence it is

not the case that whatever "belongs to" Coriscus "belongs
to" the one approaching.

But this implies nothing about

conditions under which co-designative expressions are
intersubst itutable in propositional knowledge contexts.
my interpretation does not seem to have the unfortunate

So
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consequence that Peterson’s does.
It may, however, be objected that,

in any case, on

my interpretation, Aristotle requires that
a necessary

condition for (validly) inferring
r

^

You know

from
r

You know oT

is that
r

to be

be true.
(1)
(2)
.*.(3)

o<

is the s*me as to be p*

And this is false, since surely the inference
You know Coriscus
You know tha.t Coriscus is the one approaching
You know the one approaching

should count as valid, in which case, since (2) presumably
does not imply
to be Coriscus is to be the one approaching,

the truth of this last sentence is apparently not a neces-

sary condition for the validity of the argument.

Hence,

the objector might conclude, my interpretation suffers from
a defect at least

similar to Peterson's.

Yet there is, I think, an easy response to this.

The point is simply that it is false that, on my inter-

pretation, Aristotle is committed to the view just stated.
It is true that my account has it that Aristotle

committed to the claim that, e.g., the truth of ’to be
Coriscus is the same as to be the one approaching' is a

necessary condition for validly inferring that, for any

is_
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attribute, P-ness, if Coriscus has F-ness then the one

approaching has P-ness.

But this last claim does not imply

that the truth of 'to be Coriscus is the same as to be the
one approaching' is a necessary condition for validly in-

ferring that if Coriscus has the attribute of being
known by you then the one approaching has the attribute of

being known by you.

Of course, the latter does follow

from
For any attribute, F-ness, the truth of 'to be
Coriscus is the same as to be the one approaching'
is a necessary condition for validly inferring that
if Coriscus has F-ness, then the one approaching has
F-ness

However, there is nothing in my interpretation to suggest
that Aristotle held this.^ 0
£

*

£

This, then, concludes the presentation and defence

of my interpretation of the Coriscus Puzzle.

However, we

have not yet exhausted Aristotle's remarks on the paradox.
So let us return, briefly, to De Sophistlcis Elenchis XXIV

to examine an attempt by Aristotle to discredit a solution

that was apparently in competition with his own.
26<rhe important difference between the two claims
distinguished in this paragraph is, of course, the difference between the scopes of the two occurrences of the
quantifier 'for any attribute, F-ness'.

Ill

Aristotle’s Rejection

—

the Q ua Hflcation Solution

Immediately after he presents
his own solution to
the Coriscus Puzzle,
Aristotle undertakes to show
that a
certain alternative solution
is inadequate.
Prom
Aristotle's opening sentence,
it is clear that at least
someone known to him embraced
this view.

In fact,

the

fact that Aristotle deals with
it at length might indicate
that it was a popular line
to take against the sophists.
I shall call this
alternative solution "the qualification
solution.
Th_e

Qualification

Co riscus Fuzzle

S olution as

a Response to the

Aristotle begins his discussion of the

qualification solution this way:
SOm
t
Se
a adOXeS by conf uting the ques-,?
tion.
tion
?o?°thev
For
the* say it
is possible to know and not to
0W
sai e
not in the same respect.
,J?
Wien, therefore, they do not know the
one approaching,
do k? ow Coriscus, they say that they
know and
6 Same thing > but not in the
same respect.
V.oL 179D/-11)

^

-

]!

The

question" referred to here is presumably ’Do

you know the one approaching?’

When the sophist puts this

question, it is expected that the respondent will reply,
"No."

Then the sophist goes on to argue that, since the

respondent does know Coriscus, and Coriscus is the one
approaching, he
ing.

the respondent

does know the one approach-

The proponent of the qualification solution, however,

anticipates the sophist's move, and grants at the outset
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that he both does and does not
know the one approaching.
That is, to the question 'Do
you know the one approaching?' he responds, "Yes and no."
This, then, has the
effect of confuting the sophist's
question. The proponent of the qualification
solution-let us call him
"the qualifier" for short— has
disarmed the sophist by embracing his paradoxical thesis (that
he—
the qualifier—

both knows and does not know the same
thing).
But, of course, the qualifier cannot
leave it at

that.

/Jhao

he must do is to show how he can
maintain that

he both knows and does not know the
same thing, without

contradicting himself.
that

f

I

His way of doing this is to claim

both know and do not know the same thing’, is el-

liptical for

'I

both know and do not know the same thing,

but in different respects

’

.

But what does it mean to say that one both knows

and does not know the same thing, but in different re-

spects?

First, let us consider what it might be to

know a given thing in a certain respect.

From what Aris-

totle says at SE 179b27ff., it seems that one who knows
"Coriscus, that he is Coriscus"

(

rov

Ko p(o-Kou

KoptorKo^), knows Coriscus in a certain respect

being what is expressed by

’

ore

Ko 0 ( 0^ 05

*

.

ore

— the

respect

On the other

hand, for one who does not know "the one approaching, that
he is approaching"

(ro Trpoo-cov

ore Tijooo'kov

) ,

there is a

respect in which he does not know the one approaching

— the
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respect being expressed by 'o'u

irpocr

.

27

On the basis of this, it
seems that what the
qualifier wants to suggest is that,
although one cannot
both know (simpliciter ) and
not know (simpliciter ) a

given individual, x, and although
one cannot both know and
and not know x in the same

respect— e.g. that he

is F, one

can both know and not know x
in different respects— e.g.
know x, that he is F, and not
know x, that he is G.

The application of this point to
the Corlscus

Puzzle is presumably thought to go
like this.
We can go
along with the argument that the sophist
has presented—
i

.

e

You know Corlscus.
You do not know the one approaching.
Corlscus is the one approaching.
You know and do not know the same thing.

(1)
(2)
.*.(4)

But then, when the sophist alleges that
he has led us into
a contradiction, we simply deny it.

Line (4), we say, is

elliptical for
(4)

T

You know someone, that he is Corlscus; and you do
not know that same one, that he is (the one)
approaching.

And (4)' is not a contradiction.

Aristotle
^ 7 0f

'

s

First Criticism

.

Aristotle offers two

course, expressions such as 'you know Corlscus,
that he is Corlscus' are not ordinary English.
But they
are literal translations of the Greek; and I have chosen to
retain such literalness here, rather than to offer a more
"natural" reading, for reasons that will become evident in
the next section.

im
criticisms of the qualification
solution.
this
as

The first is

have said already, it is necessary
for
tUrn ° n] he Same [point] to be corrected
refted^n
in the^
p
the same way.
But
this will not be the case
if one should adopt the same
principle in regard not
to knowing but tb being, or to
being in a cfr?ain
11 what
,J;S before one is a father, and it is
or even n it is sometimes true
y urs
that it is
6 1
0W nd not t0 know the same thing,
that
Snfnr
, ? i??
^
kina of solution
does
not apply here.
(SE 179bll-17)
•

.

.

ive

’

-

It should be recalled that Aristotle
thinks that the

various paradoxes mentioned earlier all turn
on the fallacious principle of accidence. 28 The criticism
offered
here is simply that, although the qualifier's
point may be

applicable in certain cases, there are some paradoxes of
accidence to which that point is obviously inapplicable
for example, Aristotle suggests, the "Is the dog your

father?" paradox.
\

Such a criticism is reminiscent of an objection

I

brought against both the indiscernibility interpretation
and the substitutivity interpretation.

In Chapter I,

I

argued that although these Interpretations might have some

plausibility in the context of the Coriscus Puzzle, it is
not at all clear how they might be thought to work in the

case of other paradoxes of accidence.

And, since Aris-

totle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle is held by him to
be applicable to all paradoxes of accidence, suspicion is
28 SE 179a26-27.
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thus cast on these interpretations
of that solution.

Aristotle, however, anticipates
first criticism.

a

response to this

The qualifier, he seems to think,
may

argue that although he (the qualifier)
has not presented
the solution to the Coriscus
Puzzle that Aristotle thinks

appropriate, he has, nevertheless, provided
a solution to
the paradox.
In reply to this, Aristotle allows
that a sophism

may contain more than one defect:
there is nothing to hinder the same argument
from having more than one flaw; (SE 179bl7-l8)
•

.

.

but he goes on to maintain that "it is not
the exposure of

every fault that constitutes

a

solution."

Specifically,

the sort of thing that Aristotle has in mind is
this:

.it is possible to show that something false
been derived, without showing what [the derivation]has
turns on, e.g. Zeno’s argument that there is no motion.
So that, even if one undertakes to prove that this is
impossible, he is mistaken, even if he has demonstrated
it ten thousand times.
For this is not a solution.
For it was held that the solution is the exhibition of
fallacious demonstration, from which that which is
false [is derived].
If, therefore, one has not demonstrated his case, or is attempting to prove something
true or false in a fallacious manner, the pointing out
of that is a solution,
(179bl8-26)
.

.

In other words, if, when presented with a sophism, one

simply tries to show that the conclusion of that sophism is
false by producing counter-arguments, one is not thereby

providing

a

solution to the sophism.

A

solution must make

clear precisely what has gone wrong in the sophist's

argument
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Thus, even If the qualifier's point
with respect
to the Corisous

Puzzle— l.e. that the sophist

Is entitled

to conclude not

You know (simpliciter ) and do not know
(simpliciter)
the same thing,
but only

You know someone, that he is Coriscus and you
do not
know the same one, that he is (the one) approaching

were a good one, he would still not have provided a
solution
to that paradox.

To do this, he must explain why the for-

mer does not follow

— i.e.

he must expose the fallacious

principle upon which the relevant inference depends.
Aristotle's Second Criticism

.

In his first criti-

cism of the qualification solution, Aristotle leaves open
the question of whether the qualifier's point, despite the
fact that it does not count as

Puzzle, is a good one.

a

solution to the Coriscus

In his second criticism, he argues

that it is not.

Aristotle acknowledges that there are cases in

which it is generally held to be possible to know and not
to know the same thing in different respects.

In fact, at

179b30-31, he gives an example:
it is held to be possible to know and not to
know the same thing; e.g., on the one hand, to know
that it is pale, but, on the other hand, not to know
that it is musical.
For in this way one knows and does
not know the same thing, but not in the same respect.
.

.

.

Yet Aristotle thinks that the qualifier's move with respect
to the Coriscus Puzzle simply will not work.

The qualifier
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is, according to Aristotle,
wrong in suggesting that

although
You know (simpliciter ) and do
not know (simoliciter '
the same thing

does not follow from the relevant
premisses.
You know someone, that he is
know that same one that he isCoriscus, and do not
(the one) approaching
,

does

Aristotle's argument is contained in
the following
lines

Perhaps there is nothing to prevent this
[present
10n
r m
Pp6ning [t0 be true]
some inItfnc^
yJ
tances.
let ?in these cases this would not be
thought
S°]
Cr he knows Coriscus, that he is
Coriscus,
inn
w
and L he knows]i the
one approaching that he is (the one)
approaching.
[hence] with respect to the one
approaching i.e. Coriscus —-one knows both that
he is
approaching and that he is Coriscus.
(SE 179b26-33)

^

^

'

1

.

.

.

From the first line

I

gather that Aristotle thinks

that, although
(i)

You know Coriscus

and
(ii)

You do not know the one approaching

are assumed to be true, in the context of the Coriscus

Puzzle the following statements are also true:
(iii)

You know Coriscus, that he is Coriscus

and
(iv)

You know the one approaching, that he is
approaching.

And the quotation goes on to suggest that, from (iii) and
(iv), Aristotle thinks we can infer
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(v)

You know the one approaching
i.e. Coriscus-that he is (the one)
approaching, and that he is
Coriscus

—

The point of (v) seems to
be to suggest that,
contrary to the qualifier's
supposition that the individual
concerned knows someone (i.e. the
one approaching, i.e.
Coriscus), that he is Coriscus,
but not that he is (the one)

approaching, what he in fact knows
is the one approachingi.e. Coriscus
that he is Coriscus, and that he
is

approaching
But we should note that
(iii) and

(iv) by themselves.

(v)

does not follow from

For one thing, these

premisses contain no information about
the relation between
Coriscus and the one approaching.
It seems
that at least a

necessary condition for inferring (v) from
(iii) and (iv)
is that we assume, in addition to
these premisses,

Coriscus is identical with the one approaching.
Of course,

I

have argued that Aristotle denies the truth of

this last statement.

But what we must assume is,

I

think,

that Aristotle is allowing, for the purposes of this
cri-

ticism, that the qualifier leaves unquestioned the sophist's

assumption that it is true.
In other words, Aristotle's second criticism, put

concisely, is this.

The qualifier says that all we need do

to resolve the Coriscus Puzzle is to show that the conclu-

sion is elliptical (in the way specified).

Aristotle's
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response to this is that if we
so allow the sophist the
mistaken assumption,
Coriscus is identical with the
one approaching,
then, since
You know Coriscus, that he is
Coriscus

and

You know the one approaching, that
he is approaching
are true, it follows that
You know Coriscus
i.e. the one approaching that he
(the one) approaching, and that he
is Coriscus

—

is

is also true.

But if this last statement is true,
then the

qualifier’s expanded conclusion must be false.
A._C°mme nt on Aristotle's Second Criticism

.

But

perhaps we should examine more carefully whether
Aristotle
has, in fact, shown that the qualifier is not
entitled to
his expanded conclusion.

have represented the qualifier's expanded con-

I

clusion as
(a)

You know someone, that he is Coriscus and you do
not know that same one, that he is (the one)
approaching.

And Aristotle's alleged counter-claim has been expressed as
(b)

—

You know the one approaching i.e. Coriscus
he is (the one) approaching, and that he is

— that

Coriscus
But what might have led the qualifier to assert (a)?
Let us suppose that the qualifier assumed that the

individual referred to by 'You' in the Coriscus argument
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knew the following
proposition to be true—
Coriscu s is Coriscus
but he assumed that the
same individual did not
know that
Coriscus is (the o ne)

approaching

is true.2

Then the qualifier would
be entitled to affirm

the truth of
(c)

You know that Coriscus
is Coriscus
and von
not know that Coriscus is
(the'nej approaching.
And from this statement,
it might have seemed quite
natural
to move to
(a)

You know someone, that he is
not know that same one, that Coriscus, and you do
he is (the one)
approaching. 29

In a,lng that
mi Eht have seemed quite
raf „
i. to
!
,! qualifier
natural
the
to move from (c) to
T ,
0
Ugeest that such a move would necessarily
be a
f

M

W?,--

KKiH;
Ky(c-c).

'*“•

**

(c)'

and

lf

-

—

<•>

*- (»

u,

„*

-vKy(c = a)

(a)'

(3x)[Ky(x = c)
~Ky(x = a)]
th6n Uine> for example, would reject
the infp™rS» Isimply on the
? grounds
that it involves "quantifying
intn"^
J
C
nto an opaque context. Moreover,
even in Hintikka’s
Wher "quantifying in” is permissible under
certain
conditions f,
the inference would be invalid.
To infer
we should need, in addition to (c)
( i
= c )
(3 x Ky (
However, an interesting quirk develops here. For
takes the ordinary language version of (i) to be Hintikka
(ii)
You know who Coriscus is.
And the qualifier might argue that this
(ii)
is, in any
case, a datum of the Coriscus Puzzle; hence,
although
does not follow from (c)’ alone, it is, nevertheless, (a)’
true,
since (c)' and (ii) (i.e. (i)) are both true, and
(a)
does
iollow (at least in Hintikka's system) from the
conjunction
of these latter two statements. The proof is this:
^Xy(c = c)
~Ky(c = a)1
(1)
u.
Premiss
r
r
1
=
(2)
(3x)Ky(x
c)
Premiss
r
(3)
^(3x)[Ky(x = c)
~Ky(x = a)]" e jx.
Counter.

ti ely

i'

^??T' —

)

(

’
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—

1
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.
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(x)~[Ky(x
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c)

.

~Ky(x

= a)] 1

e

^
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3

)
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.

~E)
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It does seem reasonable
to suppose that the
Individual referred to by -You'
In the

Coriscus argument would

know that Coriscus Is
Coriscus; and, of course,
he Is
ignorant of the fact that
Coriscus is (the one) approaching.
So the qualifier does
seem to be justified in
asserting
(o).
But does it follow, then,
that Aristotle's
(b) must

be false?

Certainly, Aristotle's statement.

—

You know the one approaching
i.e.
Coriscus- t-hat- h
is (the one) approaching,
and that he is Coriscus.
is false if construed as
(d)

You know that the proposition the
one approaching
r -° g us -is (the one
? ——
approaching is trim
and you know that the proposition
the one
approaching— i.e. Coriscus— is Coriscus is
true.
•

—

-J

)

.

For one who knows the proposition

IM^^p roaching-.i.e. -^o_
,

r l 3cus
.

- ls

(

th^ne)

to be true, presmuably knows also that

Coriscus is (the one) approaching
(2)

is true.

And this would contradict a basic assumption
of

the Coriscus Puzzle

i.e., that the one designated by 'You'

does not know

Coriscus is (the one) approaching
to be true.

But there seems to be at least one other way

to understand Aristotle’s assertion,
r

.(

5
6

)

,(

7

)

(

(b).

)

(3x)(x = c) 1 e p.
-1
r~[Ky(c =
c). ~Ky(c = a)]
€
r (3x [Ky (x = c). ~Ky(x =
)
a)]*

u

(C.EK=)
(*0,(5)(C.Uo)

1

£

(

3

-

)
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Perhaps what Aristotle has in
mind is simply
(e)
You know of the one approaching
(i.e., Coriscus)
however he may be designated
that he is fthe n n»\
approaching, and that he is Coriscus?
The difference between (d)
and (e) is— to use Quine’s
terminology that whereas (d) is
an "opaque” interpretation
of <b), (e) is a "transparent"
reading. 30 Consequently,
whereas (d) implies that there
is a certain proposition

—

—

Oh^agproarh^g—j^^^^Co riscus — is
lng

°

(the one) approach.

that the individual in question
knows to be true,

does not imply this.

(e)

And thus (e), unlike (d), does not

yield the undesirable result that

Coriscus is the one approaching
is known (by you) to be true.

In fact,

(e)

seems to be

quite consistent with the facts of the Coriscus
Puzzle.
ut seems to me, then,

that there is a way of

understanding how both Aristotle and the qualifier
might
have come to think that their respective claims
(a)

— were

true.

— (b)

and

And, in view of the prima facie plausi-

bility of each's case, it appears doubtful that Aristotle’s
30 See Quine's "Quantification
and Prooositional
Attitudes," The Journal of Philosop hy. LIII (1956), pp.
177-187; Word and Object (New York, I960)., l^lff.
According to Quine, a sentence
r c*
knows that p is y^
admits of the "transparent" interpretation provided that it
is implied by any sentence
r o<
knows that S is y"
where
1

n

Is S'*
/3
is also true.
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mere assertion of (b) would be sufficient
to convince the
qualifier that his claim— (a)— is false.
For Aristotle,
in fact, has not really shown it to
be false.

presented an argument for what he takes to be
claim.

He has
a

counter-

But he has nor established that it is, in
fact, a

counter-claim.

Nor has he made clear just what assumptions

his own argument rests upon, and why they
are preferable to

those adopted by the qualifier.

To use Aristotle’s own

terminology, if there is a problem with the qualifier's

inference from the premisses of the Coriscus Puzzle to (a),

Aristotle has not provided the "solution"
*

*

(

Aocrt.5

).31

*

This brings me to the end of my remarks on Aris-

totle’s treatment of the Coriscus Puzzle.

chapter

I

In the next

shall try to show how Aristotle might have come

to think of the solution to that paradox as applicable to

the other examples that he mentions.

Specifically, this will

involve showing how the principle of accidence might have
been thought to generate those paradoxes.
this is not very clear in some cases.

As we shall see,

Yet, at the same time,

the likelihood of being able to make a case for the

principle of accidence being involved in each of these
examples seems to me to be greater than the likelihood of
3lRecall Aristotle’s remarks on
179b23-24.

'

Aocrij

'

at SE
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being able to make a similar case for either
White’s
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals

or Peter-

son’s principle of substitution.
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CHAPTER V

EXTENSION OP THE INTERPRETATION TO
THE REMAINING PARADOXES

—

— You Know that which
-

am going to Ask You about?"

I

The "Do you know that which

about?

bears,

I

Coriscus Puzzle.

I

am going to ask you

have assumed, a close resemblance to
the
As a result, it is the easiest of
the

remaining paradoxes to deal with.

That is, we can show

how it might have been thought to qualify
as a paradox of
accidence simply by observing and developing
the rather
obvious parallels between it and the Coriscus
Puzzle.

The reconstruction of the "Do you know what

going to ask you about?" that
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4;
I

I

am

I

have proposed is this:

You know the good.
You do not know that which I am going to ask you
about
The good is that which I am going to ask you about.
You know and you do not know the same thing.

assume that, as in the Coriscus Puzzle,

’You know'

and

You do not know* may be taken to designate attributes.

Furthermore

to continue the parallel—— it seems reasonable

to suppose that

'that which

accident.

I

’the good’ designates the subject, and that

am going to ask you about' designates the

For then the argument can be regarded as being

of precisely the same form as the Coriscus Puzzle; i.e.

when the implicit steps are filled in, we have the following
(1)
(2)
(3)

You know the good.
You do not know that which I am going to ask you
about
The good is that which I am going to ask you about.
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^
-; /(6)

*

You do not know the good
You know the g°od and you do not
know the Food
You know and
do not know the same thing?
The fallacious inference, in
that case, would lie-

according to Aristotle

— in

the move from (2) and (3) to

For that inference goes from the
information that
that which I am going to ask you
about has the attribute,
(being) not know by you (line
(2)), together with the in(4).

formation that that which

I

am going to ask you about is

an accident of the good (line
(3)), to the conclusion that
ohe good has the attribute,

(line (4)).

(being) not known by you

And this move, Aristotle would presumably

point out, depends upon the fallacious principle of
accidence.
Of course, one may feel a bit uneasy about the sug

gestion that that which

I

am going to ask you about "is an

accident of" the good, just as one may have found it

puzzling that Aristotle should have wanted to say that the
one approaching "is an accident of" Coriscus.

But,

following my suggestion in Chapter III about the use of
cvsc' in these cases, just as
the one approaching is an accident of Coriscus
is true provided that

(i)

Coriscus is the one approaching
is true, but

(il) it is not the case that

Coriscus is the same as the one approaching
is true,

so
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ofthe^oSd®

dent

01 " 8 t0 aSk you about ls
an acei-

is true if and only if
(i)

the good is that which I
am going to ask you about
is true, but

(ii) it is not the case
that

g

the SamS 25 that Whl ° h 1 am

S

you a bo°ut!
is true.

ask

1

Again,

I

suspect, although Aristotle seems
to want

to deny that the good is the
same as (i.e.

with") that which

I

"is identical

am going to ask you about, he would

allow that the good "is accidentally
the same as" that which
I am going to ask you
about.
But there is no difficulty
with this.
For, as has been urged previously.
The good is accidentally the same as
that which
going to ask you about

I

am

does not imply
The good is the same as (i.e. "=") that which
going to ask you about.

I

am

In fact, as I interpret the notion of "accidental
sameness,"

the former implies the denial of the latter. 2

Thus it seems to me that Aristotle's solution to
the paradox presently under discussion has the same inter-

esting features that were found in his solution to the
Coriscus Puzzle.

First, Aristotle proposes that

Chapter III,

p.

7 6.

^Chapter IV, pp. 103-104.
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The good Is that which

should be understood

,

not

I

am going to ask you about

(as an unwary respondent might

assume) as an identity claim, but
as
1 arT soin S t0 ask you
about is an acci\
dpnt of the good.
dent

And then he rejects the principle
that he thinks would be
required to justify the crucial inference
in light of this
last revision— viz. the principle of
accidence.
Again in
this way, the paradox is resolved,
and the indiscernibility
of identicals is preserved.
The Diversity Paradoxes

Some Unsat is t actorv Solutions

.

As mentioned earlier,

Aristotle’s first examples of arguments that commit the
fallacy of accidence are to be found at SE l66b33f.

I

called these two arguments "the diversity paradoxes."
what follows,

I

shall present what

I

way of dealing with these paradoxes.

have
In

take to be Aristotle’s

However, before

undertaking that, let us consider how the indiscernibility
interpretation and the substitut ivity interpretation fare
with respect to these examples.
It will be recalled that,

according to the indis-

cernibility interpretation, Aristotle’s solution to the
Coriscus Puzzle consists in giving up the principle, Ind.
Id.

And since it is Aristotle's view that all paradoxes

of accidence can and ought to be solved in the same way.
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the question arises as to
how the rejection of Ind.
Id
might be thought to solve
the diversity paradoxes.
For ray purposes here, it will
be sufficient to

concentrate on the first diversity
paradox.

.*.

(

1

)

(

2

)

(

3

)

Coriscus is other than (some) man
Coriscus is (a) man
Coriscus is other than Coriscus.

At first glance, it is not
at all clear how one might
take
Ind. Id. to be the principle
that justifies the inference
from (1) and (2) and (3).
But perhaps the view is this.

First, let us take otherness-relative-to-Coriscus
to be
the attribute in question.
Then we can say that this
attribute is, in (1) said to belong to
man, while, in (3),
it is said to belong to Coriscus.
(2)

Second, suppose we read

as the identity statement
(2)’

Coriscus

=

(a)

man

In that case, the argument might go, since
Coriscus is

identical with (a) man, and (a) man has the attribute

otherness-relative-to-Coriscus, it follows by Ind. Id. that
Coriscus has that attribute too.
But how reasonable is such a suggestion?
Is quite implausible to read

(2)

as

(2)’.

Surely it

Hence, since the

indiscernibility interpretation requires this, that inter-

pretation seems, on those grounds alone, to be suspect.
fact, once one realizes that

— as

I

In

maintained in Chapter III

Aristotle’s discussion of the fallacy of accidence is in-
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tended precisely to warn against
the confusion of accidence
and identity, it is especially
difficult to envisage him
proposing such an account.
•

Does the substitutivitv
interpretation fare any
better? Plainly it does not. For,
again, we should have
to read (2) as (2)’, since the
principle held to Justify
the inference from (1) and
(2) to (3) will be something
like
If an identity statement
=
( or
is the same as
^
true, then the two expressions
'

1

...

and
salva veritate
1

1

.

.

t

»

.

are interchangeable (everywhere),

Thus the subst itutivity interpretation,
when applied to the
first diversity paradox, seems unsatisfactory
for just the
same reason as the indiscernibility
interpretation.
It is worth noting,

however, that Peterson— who

defends the substitutivity interpretation of Aristotle's

solution to the Coriscus Puzzle
with the diversity paradoxes.^

— does

deal at some length

Moreover, she obviously

wants to avoid saddling Aristotle with the view that (2)
should be read as (2)'.

On p.

119 she says (presenting

Aristotle's view), "Coriscus and man

.

.

.

are

.

.

.

not

one thing in number with one another, since man is a species

and Coriscus is not."

^Chapter III,

But this raises a difficulty.

p.

7^.

^S. L. Peterson, The Masker Paradox (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1969), p. 109ff.
,
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If Peterson's view is that
Aristotle would not

have accepted (2)' as a correct
reading of (2), then she
cannot hold that Aristotle takes
the principle underlying
the inference from (1) and
(2) to (3) to be the principle
of substitution that underlies
the Coriscus Puzzle, for
that interpretation requires
that (2) be read as (2)'.
And, in that case, she would
appear to be committed to the
view that Aristotle's treatment of
the diversity paradoxes
is different from his treatment
of the Coriscus Puzzle.
Yet Aristotle purports to provide a
single solution for all
paradoxes of accidence.
In short, then, it is not at all clear
to me how

any of the foregoing interpretations might
be thought to be
an adequate account of Aristotle's solution
to the di-

versity paradoxes.

terpretation

So let me now try to apply my own in-

.

The Fi rst Diversity Paradox

.

On my view, the falla-

cious principle that Aristotle takes to be operative in

each of the paradoxes of accidence is neither Ind. Id. nor

Peterson’s substitution principle.

principle of accidence.

It is, rather,

Thus the task to which

I

the

shall

address myself is to show how that principle might have
been thought by Aristotle to be at work in the diversity

paradoxes

5 Pe

Sophisticis Elenchis 179a26-27.
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Consider, again, the first diversity
paradox:
Coriscus is other than (some) man.
Kd)
Coriscus is (a) man.
,.(3)
Coriscus is other than Coriscus.

W

As with the Coriscus Puzzle, we
must ask "What are we to
count as subject, accident, and

attribute?"

I

have suggested that, in his discussion
of the

fallacy of accidence, Aristotle is
concerned with— among
other things— the clarification of the
"logical form"
of sentences which may appear to be
identity statements,
but which in iact, are not.
The only plausible candidate
for such a sentence in the first diversity
paradox is, of

course,

So, taking my earlier remarks on the
Coriscus

(2).

Puzzle as a guide, we should expect Aristotle
to be pointing
out that
(2)

Coriscus is (a) man

is not to be understood as

Coriscus

=

(a) man,

but, rather, as

Man is an accident of Coriscus
(Although Coriscus is (a) man, to be (a) man is simply not
the same as to be Coriscus.)

If this is correct, then the

accident in question seems to be whatever is designated
by ’man’; and the subject of which It is said to be an

accident is Coriscus.
6lt should be noted that, in presenting what

I

take
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In an earlier chapter,
it seems odd, perhaps,

that

remarked on the fact that

I

-man'

nate an accident of Coriscus.?

should be taken to desig-

But again the point is, of

course, that all that seems to
be intended by such a use
of ’accident is that although
-man’ may be predicated of,
e.g.,
Coriscus , it is not the case that
’Coriscus is the
same as ( = ) man-.
For although -man- does (on Aristotle's
view) designate Coriscus, he is not
the only individual it
designates.
In other words, whereas whatever
is designated by 'Coriscus is designated,
also, by ’man', it is
’

'

'

7

not the case that whatever is designated
by -man’ is desig-

nated by 'Coriscus*.

109al0-ll

,

.

.

.

Or, as Aristotle puts it in Topics

conversion (to

^vTc.o'Tyo

)

[in-

volving] the name of an accident is very risky."

Coriscus is (a) man

may be true; but it does not follow from this that
to be Aristotle’s solution to the diversity paradoxes
I
disregard the quantifiers (’some
’each and every') and the
indefinite article, ’a
These were inserted in my reconstructions of the arguments to yield somewhat more natural
English and to indicate, more precisely, why those arguments might have seemed worriesome to Aristotle and his
contemporaries.
It is important to note, however, that
Aristotle, himself, does not attempt to "sharpen up" the
arguments in this way
His solution proceeds independently
of such complications as might be introduced by the insertion of quantifiers etc. Just as 'Coriscus is (a)
man’ says simply, on his view, that man is an accident of
Coriscus, so ’Coriscus is other than (some) man’ says
simply that man has a certain attribute ((being) other than
Coriscus
5

,

5

.

,

.

)

^Chapter III, 67ff.
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Man is Coriscus
is true too

(as It should, of course.

If the former were

an identity statement).
But given that the subject and
accident are as

suggested , what is the attribute in
question?
remaining term in the argument is
'other’

(

'

The only

cxzpov

'

)

Of course it will not do to say
that it is simply "otherness" that is said to belong to the
accident or subject.

That would make no sense.

For "otherness" is a relation

that can belong only to a pair of individuals
taken to-

gether, not an attribute that may belong to just
one.
So, as suggested in the previous section,
what we should

say, perhaps, is that in, e.g.,
(1)

Coriscus is other than (some) man,

what is said to belong to man is the attribute "otherness-

relative-to-Coriscus

.

If we do adopt this suggestion, then we are in a

position to see how Aristotle might have come to think of
PA as the principle that licenses the inference in the first

diversity paradox.

For, given that otherness-relative-to-

Coriscus belongs to man, and that man is an accident of
Coriscus, PA allows us to infer that otherness-relative-to

Coriscus, belongs to Coriscus.
^See also C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies
Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1970), p. 85
.

(London:

135

Supposing that these remarks are
correct, then, it
is perhaps not so surprising
that Aristotle should have
wanted to say that the fallacy
underlying the first di-

versity paradox is precisely the one
that underlies the
Coriscus Puzzle.
The latter contains an inference
that may
appear (or at least may have so appeared
to some of

Aristotle

1

s

contemporaries) to be licensed by the legiti-

mate principle of the indiscernibility
of identicals.

Yet— Aristotle’s

story might be thought to

go— once

one is

brought to realize that the crucial inference
in the

Coriscus Puzzle is similar in form to the crucial
inference in the first diversity paradox, and that
the latter,

plainly, is not legitimized by the indiscernibility of

identicals, one may then be in a position to disabuse oneself of the mistaken assumption that the Coriscus Puzzle

itself depends on Ind. Id.
The Second Diversity Paradox

.

Since there is con-

siderable resemblance between the first diversity paradox
and the second, we can gain considerable advantage in our

consideration of the latter from what has been said already
about the former.

The second diversity paradox, it will be

recalled, is open to two readings.
(1)
(2)
(3)

The first is this:

Man is other than Socrates.
Socrates is (a) man.
Man is other than man.

It is not difficult to see how the inference from (1) and
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to

(2)

(3)

in this argument might have
been thought to

depend upon PA.
the subject,

If we suppose that

'man'

'Socrates’ designates

the accident, and 'Man (is) other
than’

the attribute, then what is inferred
is that the attribute,

otherness-relative-zo-man

which belongs to the subject,

,

Socrates, belongs also to the accident,
man.

And this in-

ference is legitimized by PA.
The second reading of the second diversity
paradox

— viz
Coriscus is other than Socrates.
Socrates is (a) man.
Coriscus is other than (each and every) man.

(4)
(5)
.*.(6)

is no more difficult to deal with.

Let Socrates be the

subject, man the accident, and otherness-relative-to-

Coriscus the attribute.

Then, since otherness-relative-to-

Coriscus belongs to Socrates and man is an accident of
Socrates, we can say that
by (6)
man.

9

— is

w hat
r

is inferred

— and

expressed

that otherness-relative-to-Coriscus belongs to

And again, it is PA that is held to justify this

inference
It seems to me, then, that on either reading of the

^Notice, again, that although the conclusion of the
second reading of the second diversity paradox requires
something like the insertion of the quantifier ’each and
every' to bring out its absurdity, Aristotle does not concern
himself with this. What is of importance to him is just that
’o Kopto-Kos srepov c*v£p ojrrou
says that man has the attribute, (being) other than Coriscus.
'
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second diversity paradox there is an
inference that might
have been thought by Aristotle to
depend upon PA. Hence,
as with the first diversity paradox
it is understandable

that he should have taken that sophism
to be a paradox of

accidence

*

*

*

Before leaving the diversity paradoxes, there is
a

further observation that

I

wish to make.

On both versions

of the second diversity paradox, there is an inference

from information about a certain subject’s having a given

attribute to the conclusion that an accident of that subject has it as well.

On the other hand, if Aristotle con-

ceived of the first diversity paradox in the way described,
we have an inference from the information that a certain

accident has a particular attribute to the conclusion that
the subject of that accident has it also.

This,

I

suggest,

supports my earlier claim that the principle of accidence
is not simply

— despite

the oversight in SE ch. 24

— the

conditional^ 0
If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x, then
(z)(z belongs to x if z belongs to y).

Paradoxes of accidence sometimes, instead, make use of the

principle
If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x, then

•^Recall my discussion in Chapter III, 55PP*
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(z)(z belongs to y if

z

belongs to x).

Thus the principle of accidence seems
to be more accurately
represented as
If x is a subject, and
y is an accident of x, then
(z)(z belongs to x if and only if z
belongs to y).’

The Possessive Paradoxes
An__

M

Obvious"' Interpretation

.

As noted in Chapter

II, there are three paradoxes of accidence
stated by Aris-

totle that seem to be of the form
x is
x is
/.x

your (my) own

(a) G
is your (my) own G

For convenience, in the following discussion

I

shall ad-

dress most of my remarks to just one of these paradoxes
(call it "PI”)
(1)
(2)
.*.(3)

The dog is your own
The dog is a father
The dog is your own father

Peterson has remarked that, although arguments of
this form may be such that no-one would be inclined to

accept them as valid, they are nevertheless of considerable

interest insofar as it is not clear just what that form is:
In case the reader thinks that no one would be tempted
to suppose the original argument valid anyway, he might
try the exercise of representing it in some quantifi-

cation theory.
A rather natural representation, which
cannot be correct, is:
Yd
Fd
Fd. Yd

with ’Y', F’, d and
taking the obvious roles.
The representation cannot be correct, because it is a
T

T

T
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valid argument and the original
was not.
So the
representation does not exhibit the
logical
form of
the possessive paradox.
It may of course be said that
have represented instead the argument:
This dog is yours
This d o g is a father
yours and this d og Is a father
hich is valid (Aristotle notes that
an
argument about a slave of yours which is analogous
a child would
ld in Cha
er xxiv of S °P h El.).
There is still,
P?
thnu^
hough, ->
die proDlem of how to reoresent the
false conn
This dog is your father' in quantification
thPo™
theory
We should not like just to pick a whole
new
indissoluble predicate, say 'G', and write it
'Gd'.
The resultant argument:
Fd
-

Yd
Gd

would indeed not be valid, and in that respect it
would
reproduce a logically important feature of the original
argument but the conclusion 'Gd' would lack the logically important feature of the original conclusion 'This
dog is your father' of entailing— at least so one naturally supposes that this deg is a father. 1 !
;

—

Peterson, however, does not discuss these matters further.
Nor, unfortunately, does she make any suggestions about
why

Aristotle might have seen fit to classify the possessive
paradoxes as paradoxes of accidence.
I

share Peterson’s view that the possessive para-

doxes are of considerable interest.

In fact, they seem, at

least at first glance, to bear some resemblance to fal-

lacious arguments such as
This elephant is small
This elephant is an animal
.-.This elephant is a small animal.

And although, to my knowledge, no-one in recent times has

taken up the specific problem of analysing sentences con11 Peterson, op cit
.

.

,

pp.

162-163 In. 16.

14 Q

taining possessive adjectives (’your', ’my' etc.),
there
have been efforts to analyse sentences containing
adjectives such as

called

'small'

— i.e.

non-predicative

1

adjectives that Parsons has

adjectives

.

But my concern,

here, is specifically with Aristotle and possessive

adjectives.

So let me turn, now, to the task of trying

to show how he--Aristot le

— may

have come to think of the

possessive paradoxes as sophisms that commit the fallacy
of accidence.
At first glance, it seems that there is pernaps a

rather obvious way of showing how the argument, PI, might
have been thought to turn on the fallacious principle of

accidence.
’father’

Taking 'the dog' to designate the subject,

to designate the accident, and

designate the attribute,

(1)

'your own’

to

tells us that your own is an

1?

T. Parsons, "Some Problems Concerning the Logic
of Grammatical Modifiers," in Semantics of Natural Language
ed. Davidson and Harman, (Reidel, 1972), pp
127-142.
'Small',
according to Parsons, qualifies as a "non-predicative”
adjective in virtue of the fact that sentences of the form
x is a small P
are not analysable as
x is small and x is an F
But Aristotle seems to have noticed that this feature belongs also to possessive adjectives such as 'crov' ('your
At least, he makes it clear that he thinks that
own’).
x is your own and x is an F
does not imply
(SE l80a5-8).
x is your own F.
For further discussions relevant to "non-predicative"
adjectives, see also H. Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic
Logic (Free Press, 1966), esp. Section 53; J. Wallace,
"Positive Comparative, Superlative," The Journal of Philosophy , LXIX No. 21 (1972), pp. 773-732.
,

.

,

,

1M
attribute of the dog, (2) tells us
that father is an
accident of the dog, and (3), we might

say, tells us that

your own belongs to father.

And the inference from (1)

and (2) to (3) is, in that case, one
that would be licensed
by the principle of accidence.
It seems plausible to hold that

’father' desig-

nates an accident of the subject, this dog.

But while it

may appear appropriate to say that the attribute,
your own,
belongs to the dog, it is not so clear what it
could mean
to say

— as

we would have Aristotle doing on the view just

outlined— that your own

is an attribute of father.

In

fact, what this seems to suggest is that the dog’s acci-

dent, father, is to be counted among ”your

!t

possessions.

And surely this is absurd.

Hamblin's Version of the "Is the Dog your Father
There is, however, one suggestion that

I

to alleviate this last difficulty.

L.

C.

:'

know of that seems

Hamblin proposes,

at one point, that perhaps the way Aristotle conceives of

the "Is the dog your father?" paradox is simply as follows:
(i)

(ii)
(iii)

The dog is yours.
The dog is a father.
The father is yours. 13

If we adopt this reformulation, then we no longer have to

"...

13c. L. Hamblin, Fallacies
the
p. 86.
source of invalidity of the quasi-syllogism 'The dog is
yours: the dog is a father; therefore, the father is yours'
could be traced to the non-convertibility of 'The dog is a
father', in virtue of the fact that not all fathers are
this dog."
,
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say that yours (or, your own) is
said to belong to father.
Rather, it is— as is made clear in
(iii)
said to belong

—

to a particular

father— the one which the dog

is.

Yet, although Hamblin's proposal has
the advant-

age of alleviating one difficulty, it
seems to raise at

least one other.

Briefly, it seems to me that it might

be argued that Hamblin's formulation of the
argument is,

unlike the original version, non-paradoxical

.

For pre-

sumably (i) is elliptical for something like,
The dog is your property

(i)'

In view of this, it might be urged that

'yours', in (i),

designates the attribute cf (being) your property (or,
perhaps, "belonging to you").

And since Aristotle thinks

that, in the conclusions of the argument, the same attri-

bute that is ascribed to one thing in (i) is ascribed to

something else, (iii) would have to be taken by him to
be elliptical for
(iii)'

The father (i.e. the dog in question, which
happens to be a father) is your property.

But (iii)', unlike the conclusion of PI
(3)

— seems

— i.e.,

The dog is your own father
to be true

,

Interestingly enough, as suggested earlier, in
Chapter II, Aristotle himself says something at SE l80a5ff.
that seems rather like the point that

trying to make.
oyO

LcttC

I

have just been

The text, again, is this:

toufo

o-ov

Vex

c.

eo-ct

de touto teKVoV
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friv

Sp« r==To t£kvov.

¥

Str t eruu,
„ KCV
Ve*
K of 0*0 v
rtxvov c^/\A o<j crov rtKvoy,
(Is this year own?
Yes.
And is
a child’
Then
yonr own [is] this child; because this
it happens to be
our own and a child > but
ls not your own
chi^d)
7

.

C

C.

;

“

Here,

take the su ge estion to be that, although,
from the
premisses
I

Tnis is your own
and

This is a child,
we cannot conclude
-his is your own child ([tooto

crov

]

xckvov

)

we can, nevertheless, conclude

Your own is this child,
or, more naturally,

This child is your own

Thus,

I

(

crov

.

,

.

toot o -t£xvov).

suspect that Aristotle would want to say

llel fashion--that

,

— in

para-

although the premisses

The dog is your own

and
The dog is a father
do not imply

The dog is your own father,

they do imply
The father (i.e. the dog) is your own.
And so, presumably, since he plainly thinks that the "Is
the dog your father?" involves an inference to an absurd
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concxusion, Aristotle would find Hamblin's
version un-

satisfactory

.

The situation, then, seems to be this.

On the one

hand, a move such as Hamblin’s (i.e. which
simply involves

changing the subject of (3) and predicating
'your own'
(by itself) of that subject) appears to be
unacceptable

both in its own right, and from Aristotle's point
of view.
It is important,

in any reconstruction of the paradox, to

preserve the fact that, while 'your own' in (1) is elliptical for something like 'your o wn property', in
(3)
own'

is

(explicitly) concatenated with 'father'

is not elliptical for

'your own property').

'your

(and hence

Yet, on the

other hand, the "obvious" interpretation, that Aristotle
thinks of ’your own' as designating something that can be

thought of as an attribute of something like the accident,
father, is hard to make sense of.
to be called for

— if

Consequently, what seems

we are to make plausible the view

that the possessive paradoxes depend on the principle of

accidence--is a somewhat "less obvious" interpretation.
A "Less Obvious" Interpretation

further,

I

Before proceeding

should like to emphasize a point that was raised

In the previous section.
(1)

.

There

I

suggested that

The dog is your own

might reasonably be taken to be elliptical for something
like

1*45

The dog is your own property

(1)

Moreover, there is some evidence that
Aristotle recognizes
this.
For example, in presenting the
"Is the statue my
own work? " paradox, he says
Ncr if this Is mine, and this is
a work, is it nv

In other words, if this is mine,
then, although it is not
(1)
my work, it is_ my " such-and-such "
.

Let us, then, reconsider the "Is the dog
your

father?" making the first premiss more
explicit:
'

(2)
/.(3)

i.e.

The dog is your own property
The dog is a father
The dog is your own father!5

Does this revision suggest any further possibilities
for
the analysis of the argument?
It is worth noting,

I

think, that both ’property'

and ’father’ are "relational predicates." 16

^ De
mine

Sophisticis Elenchis 179b4-6.

Moreover
The emphasis is

I5lt should be noted that in making the premiss
This dog is your own’ more explicit, I have avoided simply
filling it out as ’This dog is your own dog'. There is reason to think that Aristotle would not, strictly speaking,
regard 'dog' as an appropriate filler. here. For/ at Categories 8a22f f
Aristotle says,
a man is not called
someone’s man nor an ox someone's ox nor a log someone's log
(but it is called someone's property)."
(Ackrill’s translation)
.

,

"...

.

l6 "In [Chapter 7 of the Categories

Aristotle] does
not, for the most part, treat of relations (similarity,
slavery) but rather, in effect, of relational predicates
('similar', 'slave')." Aristotle’s Categories and De
,
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according to the Cat egories
by

property*

’

and

,

both 'The dog as designated

*The dog as designated by

'father'*

are good examples of designators of
what Aristotle calls

relatives nl 7

Keeping this last point in mind, it
seems

to me that it might have been fairly
natural for Aristotle
to understand
(1)'

The dog is your own property

and
The dog is your own father

(3)

as saying something about, not the dog, but,
rather, the

dog as designated by 'property' and the dog as designated
by 'father', respectively.
But what might, e.g.,

The dog is your own property

(1)'

be taken to be saying about the dog as designated by 'pro-

perty'?

It seems not quite right to say that

(1)'

that "relative" simply that it has the attribute,

your own.
tical.
Is

For, as mentioned above,

'your own'

says of
(being)

is ellip-

Nor will it do to say that what is being attributed

(being) your own property.

For then the resultant

Interpretatione translated with notes by J. L. Ackrill,
Both father' and 'property' are given as examples
9o
in Categories ch. 7.
,

p~

.

17"A "relative" is for [Aristotle] neither a relative term nor a person or thing designated by a relative
term, but rather a person or thing as designated by some
relative term." Aristotle's Categories
(unpublished
translation with notes by S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B.
Matthews), note
23.
,

ft
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argument would run into the same difficulty
as Hamblin's

reconstruction 18
.

There is, however, a further possibility that
seems to me to be worth considering.

In his opening re-

mark on "relatives," Aristotle says.
The things that are called relatives are those which
ar e said to be just w hat they are either of (or
than or
t£) other things or, in some other way iiTrelatlorT'to
another. 1 ^
r

,

In other words, a given relative may be said to have the

attribute of being something that is said to be just what
it is relative to something else.

Thus, for example, if

we take the dog as designated by

'property' to be a rela-

tive, we might say that it has the attribute of being

something that is said to be just what it is relative to
something-or-other.

And, if the dog is your property then

the "something-or-other" is you

.

To put the point con-

cisely, it seems to me that Aristotle might have found it

natural to understand
l^That is, if 'The dog is your own property' were
construed as ascribing to the dog as designated by 'property’ the attribute of being your own property, then the
conclusion of the sophism 'The dog is your father' would
have to be taken as
The dog as designated by 'father' is your own property.
(The same attribute that is ascribed in the premiss must,
if the inference proceeds by PA, be ascribed in the conAnd, as with the conclusion of Hamblin's verclusion).
sion, this seems not to be absurd in the way that
The dog is your own father

—

is

^ categories

,

6a36f.

(tr.

Cohen and Matthews).
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The dog is your own property

(1)

as saying something like

(1)"

The d °S as designated by ’property' is
something that is said to be just what it is relative to (i.e. of) you.

And, in similar fashion,

The dog is your own father

(3)

might have been construed as saying comething like
The dog as designated by ’father' is something
that is said to be just what it is relative to
(i.e. of) you.

(3)'

Let us suppose, then, that (1)" and (3)' are

satisfactory "Aristotelian readings" of (1)' and (3),
respectively.

In that case, it seems that an attribute

that, in (1)', is said to belong to the dog as designated
by ’property’ is said, in (3), to belong to the dog as

designated by ’father’
'(is)

— viz.

the attribute designated by

something that is said to be just what it is relative

to (i.e. of) you'.

Thus, if the dog as designated by 'pro-

perty' were taken to be a subject, and the dog as desig-

nated by ’father' as an accident of that subject, or vice
versa, the principle of accidence, on the basis of this

Information, would be sufficient to license the inference
from (1)

’

'

to

(3)

20of course, to treat, e.g., the dog as designated
by 'property' as subject, and the dog as designated by
'father’ as accident, is to ascribe to Aristotle (at least
on my interpretation) the view that although
The dog as designated by 'property' is the dog as
designated by 'father'
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In otner words, if the argument
were construed as
(

1

)”

The dog as designated by ’property
thing that is said to be just what is someit is relative to you.
The dog as designated by ’father’ is
an accident of the dog as designated by
property
(or vice versa)
The dog as designated by ’father’ is
something
that is said to be just what it is relative
to
you.
’

(

2

’

)

'

/. (

3

)

then it would appear reasonable to suppose
that it committed
the fallacy of accidence.

Perhaps, however, there is no need even to assume
that one of the two relatives

— the

dog as designated by

'property', and the dog as designated by

'

father —must
'

be regarded as the subject, and the other as the
accident.

Perhaps we can simply treat both as accidents— accidents
that is, of the subject, the dog 21
.

seems more appropriate.

This,

I

must admit,

Of course, what we have, in that

is true, it is not the case that
The dog as designated by 'property'
nated by ’father’
is true.

=

the dog as desig-

21 Again, of course, to treat each
of these relatives
as an accident of the dog is to say (i)
that although
The dog is the dog as designated by ’property'
is true.
The dog = the dog as designated by ’property’
is not; and (ii) that although
The dog is the dog as designated by 'father'
is true,
The dog = the dog as designated by ’father’
is not.
(The being ('Co c(voa) of the dog is neither the
same as the being of the dog as designated by 'property nor
the same as the being of the dog as designated by 'father
'

1

.
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case, is an inference from information that
an accident of
a given subject has a certain attribute,
to the conclusion

that another accident of the same subject has
that attribute.

But brief reflection on the principle of
accidence

shows that that principle (i.e. PA) in fact implies
that

whatever attributes any accident of a given subject has,
belong also to that subject’s other accidents.

^

So,

even if we allow that both the dog as designated by ’property’

,

and the dog as designated by 'father' are accidents

of the dog, the "Is the dog your father?" is still appropri-

ately classifiable as a paradox that arises from the ac-

ceptance of the principle of accidence.
The "Is the statue my work?" and the "Is this your

child?" present no new difficulties.

In the former, on

the interpretation just given, there is an inference from
the information that a certain accident of the statue

the statue as designated by 'possession'

bute,

— has

— viz.

the attri-

(being) something that is said to be just what it is

relative to (i.e. of) me, and that the statue as designated
by 'work' is an accident of the statue, to the conclusion

that the statue as designated by 'work' has the attribute
2 ^To

illustrate, let a and b be any two accidents
of a given subject, s_, and let F-ness be an attribute of a.
We can show, then, that PA allows us to infer that F-ness
is also an attribute of b:
F-ness belongs to a
(1)
(Premiss
a is an accident of s_
(2)
( Premiss
F-ness belongs to s
.*.(3)
(1) (2) PA
b is an accident of s
(4)
(Premiss
.‘.(5)
F-ness belongs to b
(3) (4) PA
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of (being) something that is said to be
just what it is

relative to (i.e. of) me.

And in the "Is this your child?"

the inference can be said to proceed from the
information

that this (individual) as designated by 'slave'

dent of this (individual)— has the attribute,

— an

acci-

(being)

something that is said to be just what it is relative
to
(i.e. Ox) you, and that this

'child'

(individual) as designated by

is an accident of this

(individual), to the con-

clusion that this (individual) as designated by 'child' has
the attribute,

(being) something that is said to be just

what it is relative to you.
Of course, nowhere in his discussion of the pos-

sessive paradoxes does Aristotle lay things out in just
this way.

In fact, he gives us virtually no clues at all

about how these particular examples might be thought to
fit the pattern of paradoxes of accidence.

Moreover, the

"surface structure" of the possessive paradoxes suggests,
as

I

have tried to indicate, no obvious way of showing how

they might have been thought to fit the mold.

Yet it seems

to me that the interpretation just proposed does, neverthe-

less, provide a possibility that is at least consonant with,
if not supported by, other things that Aristotle says, and

hence is an account worth considering.
The "Is a Few Taken a Few Times a Few?"

Poste's Version.

The last of the examples of para-
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doxes of accidence listed in Chapter II is the "Is
a few

taken a few times a few?"

Although, with respect to most

of the paradoxes of accidence, Aristotle gives us at
least
some indication of ho w they go, no such clues are provided

for this example.
to assume that

But again, of course, it is reasonable

uhe pattern established for the other para-

doxes may be used as a guide.

Specifically, this involves

looking for a reconstruction on which the paradox can be
shown to turn on the principle of accidence.

Let us con-

sider, first, the reconstructions proposed by Poste and

Joseph
Poste'
(1)
(2)
.’.(3)

s

reconstruction is this:

A four multiplied by a four is a large number
A four multiplied by a four is a four
A four is a large number 2

At first glance, it may appear chat this formulation does

yield an inference-pattern that is licensed by PA.
'A four'

to designate the subject, and,

'A

Taking

four multiplied

by a four' to designate the accident, it might be suggested
that the attribute,

(being a) large number, is inferred to

belong to the former cn the grounds that it belongs to the
latter
But, as Poste himself points out, there are actually

four terms in this reconstruction.

For 'A four multiplied

by a four' in (2) "means the first-named factor," whereas
23e. Poste, Aristotle on Fal laci es of the_ Sophistici
Elenchi (London: MacMillan and Co., l’3"56), p. 73~.
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in (1) it "means the product of the
factors. "2 4

So

,

in-

stead of being an inference that could be
said to depend
on PA, and, hence, to commit the fallacy of
accidence,
the argument that Poste has offered seems,
rather, to be
an instance of

as Foste in fact admits

— "equivocation."

Or, perhaps, had Aristotle conceived of the
argu-

ment in Poste*

s

way, he may have even classified it as a

fallacy of "combination" (rr^^

cruvOrjcriv)

.

For the

inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is valid provided that
’A

four multiplied by a four* is treated the same in both

sentences in which it occurs.
A four

It is in the shift from

(multiplied by a four) is a four

to
(A

four multiplied by a four) is a four

that the fallacy is committed.

And this might be thought

to fall in the same class as inferences from, e.g.,
I

saw a man being beaten (with my eyes)

I

saw a man (being beaten with my eyes).

to

But, whatever the case, on Poste

*s

2^

reconstruction,

the paradox in question seems to be, clearly, not a para-

dos of accidence.

Joseph's Version
2

Ibid

2 ^For

.

•

pp.

.

Joseph's reconstruction of the
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discussion of the fallacy of "combination"
see De Sophist lei s E l enchls XX.
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Is a ffcw taken a few times a few?"
seems to me to run

into difficulties similar to Poste’s.

Joseph suggests that

the argument goes like this:
(4)
(5)
.‘.(6)

Six is a few

Thirty-six is six times six.
Thirty-six is a few. 26

But why should this argument be thought
to qualify as a

sophism

rr«:yo«

-c

6

cro^j3 zp, TjKo^

.

Joseph does say that "six times six" is "an accidental way of regarding thirty-six things."
his view is that

So perhaps

’six times six' designates an accident

of thirty-six (or maybe "designates thirty-six accidentally").

In that case, it would seem reasonable to suppose

that he takes

’thirty-six' to designate the subject.

And,

finally, we might suppose that the attribute is what is

designated by ’(is a) few'.
Yet there is a problem here in that the first

premiss is simply
(4)

Six is a few.

In other words,

(being a) few seems to be attributed to

something simply designated by 'six’.

Thus, we have a

fourth term again.
But perhaps the argument that Joseph has in mind
is, more explicitly,
(7)

(Oxford,

Six times six is a few
w. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic
1916), p. 587-
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Thirty-six is six times six
Thirty-six is a few.

(8)
.*.(9)

And then it at least a ppears that we
have the appropriate
three terms, as we are supposed to—
viz. ’six
times six',

thirty-six’, and ’(is) a few'.

But is this in fact the

case?

Presumably (8), if true, means something like
(8)'

Thirty-six is the product of the factors, six
and six.

That is,

'six times six'

thirty-six.

— in

(8)

— designates

the number

Yet in,

Six times six is a few,

(7)

'six times six' does not designate thirty-six (for it is

assumed to be false that thirty-six is a few).

Rather, it

designates (as Poste would put it) "the first-named
factor"

— i.e.

six.

In short, on Joseph's reconstruction, if the two

premisses are to be true, then 'six times six' must be
taken to designate different entities in each premiss.
And, in that case, it seems that the inference involved is

not one that could be licensed by the principle of accidence.

The fallacy lies, instead, as Poste thinks, in

equivocation.
A

More Plausible Version

.

I

take the equivocation

involved in each of the previous reconstructions to be
sufficient to rule them out as adequate versions of the
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argument referred to as the "Is a few taken a few times
a
few?"

Let me now suggest a version that not only does not

suffer from this defect, but also seems to be such that it
is plausible to suppose that it might have been thought
to

depend upon the principle of accidence.
It will be recalled that the sophist's aim is to

draw the respondent into admitting
least an absurdity of some sort.

a

contradiction, or at

Thus, when he asks "Do

you know the one approaching?" the unwary respondent says
"No."

The sophist goes on, however, to provide an argu-

ment intended to show that the respondent does know the one

approaching.
involves,

I

The "Is a few taken a few times a few?"

suspect, a similar procedure.

"Is a few taken a few times a few?"

replies "No"

— presumably

The sophist asks

And the respondent

aware that, e.g. eight (a few)

multiplied by itself is not a few.

(Or perhaps the res-

pondent is aware of the even more interesting fact that

a

consequence of allowing that a few taken a few times is a
few is that every number, in that case, turns out to be a
few.)

Having secured the respondent's denial, however, the

sophist proceeds to provide an argument to show that "a few

taken a few times

is_

a few."

And that argument,

I

suggest,

goes like this:
(1)
(2)
.\(3)

Four is (a) few.
Four is (a) few (taken a) few times
(A) few (taken a) few times is (a) few.
On this reconstruction of the argument,

(being a)
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Tew Is said, in (1), to belong to
the number designated
by ’Four
In (3), however, it is concluded
that the same
1

.

attribute belongs to whatever is designated
by ’(A) few
(taken a) few times’.
I suggest, therefore, that
we might
take '(is a) few’ to designate the
attribute, ’four' to

designate the subject, and ’(a) few (taken
a) few times’ to
designate the accident of that subject. Then we
can say

that the inference is one that proceeds from
the informa-

tion that a certain subject, four, has the
attribute, (being a) few, and that a few taken a few times is
an accident
of four, to the conclusion that that accident
also has the

attribute, (being a) few.

And this inference is one that

would be licensed by the principle of accidence. 2 ?
Again, then, there would appear to be a way of

extending Aristotle’s solution to the Coriscus Puzzle to
the sophism presently under consideration.

First, on my

interpretation, we should take him to be concerned to point
out that, although four is a few taken a few times, it is
not the case that four is the same as
P7

(

=

)

a few taken a

—

Notice again, however, that as in the diversity
paradoxes although we should perhaps want to "sharpen up"
the argument (by inserting appropriate quantifiers, etc.)
before dealing with it, Aristotle here disregards such matters.
That is, although we might think it important to point out that

—

few (taken a) few times is (a) few
is false only if understood as
(3)'
(Every) few (taken a) few times is (a) few,
what Aristotle seems to regard as important is simply that
has
(3) expresses that the accident, few (taken a) few times
a certain attribute
viz. (being) a few.
(3)

(A)

—

,
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xew times.

To be four is not the same as to
be a few

taken a few times.
an accident of four.

Hence, a few taken a few times is simply

Second, once the second premiss is

correctly understood, it becomes clear that the
inference
from (1) and (2) to (3) depends upon the
principle of

accidence--a principle that can be (and ought to be)
rejected, without giving up the indiscernibility of
identicals

.
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